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404 PROVIDER NOT FOUND: CONTRIBUTIONS
AND SOLUTIONS TO INADEQUATE PROVIDER
NETWORKS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CARE
Travis C. Williams*
ABSTRACT
Despite the efforts of policymakers, access to in-network behavioral
health care services has continued to lag relative to other types of
health care. Many psychiatrists, for example, do not accept insurance,
limiting access to their services to only those individuals who can
afford to pay out of pocket. Several factors contribute to insurance
networks’ paucity of behavioral health care providers, including low
insurance reimbursement for behavioral health care services,
inadequate regulation and enforcement, provider shortages, and a
lack of access to telehealth services. To maximize the utility of existing
regulatory structures, states should take an outcome-oriented
enforcement approach that principally monitors appointment wait
times to evaluate how well insurance networks meet their enrollees’
behavioral health needs. Additionally, policymakers should aim to
strengthen internet infrastructure, broaden scopes of practice to
encompass telehealth services, establish quantitative reimbursement
minimums for some services, foster early interest in behavioral health
careers, and adjust federal loan repayment programs to maximize
recruitment to the behavioral health care workforce. Finally,
lawmakers should create tax incentives to encourage behavioral
health care providers to accept insurance.

* J.D. & M.P.H. Candidate, 2023, Georgia State University College of Law and School of Public
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INTRODUCTION
In the days before April 18, 2019, Kristi Bennett and her family
called more than a dozen mental health facilities.1 Desperate to find
help for her, they tried establishments both in and out of her home state
of Kansas.2 According to her family, however, the facilities and
Bennett’s insurance company, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas,
blocked them at every turn. 3 Before going to bed on April 18, Bennett
took fifteen Wellbutrin.4 She never woke up.5
Kristi Bennett’s tragic story provides a bleak example of the human
costs of a behavioral health care system that lacks the capacity to
adequately care for people who need its help. 6 Unfortunately, stories
that illustrate the shortfalls of behavioral health treatment in the United
States remain all too common.7 Many people suffering from a mental
health crisis encounter a system generally ill-equipped to meet their
needs.8
1. Lisa Gutierrez & Jonathan Shorman, Kansas Woman Tried to Get Help, but Insurance Denied It.
Then She Overdosed and Died, KAN. CITY STAR (Jan. 13, 2020, 5:00AM),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/business/health-care/article239014028.html [https://perma.cc/3BTV4W2X].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Kristi Bennett’s family believes her overdose was accidental. Id. In response to her death, Blue
Cross said, “Our hearts go out to the family and friends of Ms. Bennett, as they cope with their
heartbreaking loss.” Id. Kansas state senators introduced a bipartisan bill, named after Bennett, limiting
utilization reviews conducted by health plans on January 13, 2020. S.B. 249, 2020 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2020);
Kansas Senate Bill 249, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/KS/bill/SB249/2019 [https://perma.cc/75R775Z9]. The bill died in committee on May 21, 2020. Id.
6. See Gutierrez & Shorman, supra note 1; see also, e.g., Lindsay Kalter, Treating Mental Illness in
the ED, ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS. (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/treatingmental-illness-ed [https://perma.cc/3SRV-ZNFU] (describing the problems that mental health patients
encounter in emergency departments). In this Note, the umbrella term “behavioral health” encompasses
both mental health and substance use disorder (SUD).
7. See, e.g., Zachary Woerner, Note, The Failed Promise of Mental Health Parity in Virginia: A
Missing Key in Mental Healthcare Access, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 549, 552 (2019). On November
18, 2013, Virginia State Senator Creigh Deeds’s son, Gus Deeds, was “prematurely released from an
emergency custody order” after his father was unable to find him a hospital bed in the state of Virginia.
Id. “Once released, Gus attacked his father and committed suicide.” Id.
8. See Scott Zeller, What Psychiatrists Need to Know: Patients in the Emergency Department, 35
PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES,
Aug.
2018,
at
2,
2,
https://cdn.sanity.io/files/0vv8moc6/psychtimes/2ebaaaa0746d15b0e7170c3d3198ba93d75bd350.pdf/ps
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The system’s failings have led politicians to call for a greater focus
on behavioral health in recent years. 9 The broader scale of behavioral
health problems in the United States, which has been exacerbated by
the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020, justifies these calls for greater
awareness.10 In today’s troubling landscape of behavioral health care
delivery, access to care continues to pose the most significant
challenge.11
Some of the trouble with access to behavioral health care stems from
providers’ low participation in insurance networks compared with
other types of care.12 Legislators have sought to counter this and other
y0818_ezine.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YG5-SNA8]; see also Kalter, supra note 6. People seeking behavioral
health treatment encounter long wait times for an appointment, insurance issues, difficulties paying for
care, and a host of other problems. Id.
9. Grayson Schmidt, Here’s Why Everyone Should Be Talking About Mental Health Care in 2020,
SHONDALAND (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.shondaland.com/act/news-politics/a30614644/mental-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/Q7BX-PSVD] (referencing numerous proposals made by various politicians in
2020 to increase funding for mental health and SUDs and introduce legislation aimed at improving
transparency in behavioral health care).
10. See LAURA HARKER, GA. BUDGET & POL’Y INST., GEORGIA’S COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH
RESPONSE MUST INCLUDE SUPPORT FOR STABLE, QUALITY HOUSING 5, 7 (2020), https://gbpi.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/05/20200506-healthyhousing3.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT5Q-G7RV]; see also Stats
of the States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT.,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/stats_of_the_states.htm [https://perma.cc/6CL4-3B3M] (Mar. 4,
2021) (demonstrating that suicide was among the top ten causes of death in thirty-two states in 2018); see
also Mental Illness, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mentalillness.shtml [https://perma.cc/DA8S-W9P8] (Jan. 2022) (indicating that nearly one in five adults, or 52.9
million people in the United States, were living with mental illness in 2020). Both unstable employment
and unstable housing situations, which have been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, can contribute
to mental illnesses. HARKER, supra. In general, the role of housing as a social determinant of mental health
is well-documented. See, e.g., PAULA BRAVEMAN, MERCEDES DEKKER, SUSAN EGERTER, TABASHIR
SADEGH-NOBARI & CRAIG POLLACK, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOUSING AND HEALTH 6
(2011),
https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2011/05/housing-and-health.html
[https://perma.cc/2F9A-T3BC] (linking residential overcrowding and affordable housing with mental
health in adults and children). Social isolation caused by social distancing policies implemented in the
wake of COVID-19, in addition to the inherent uncertainty associated with a global pandemic, can also
increase loneliness, stress, and anxiety. Mental Health: Coping with Stress, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/managing-stressanxiety.html [https://perma.cc/7HDW-83V3] (July 22, 2021).
11. See, e.g., RON HONBERG, SITA DIEHL & DANIA DOUGLAS, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, A
LONG ROAD AHEAD: ACHIEVING TRUE PARITY IN MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE CARE 1–2, 3
(2015), https://www.nami.org/Support-Education/Publications-Reports/Public-Policy-Reports/A-LongRoad-Ahead/2015-ALongRoadAhead [https://perma.cc/VWD8-DAYS] (listing a survey’s findings about
numerous barriers to obtaining mental health care, including finding in-network mental health care
providers, high rates of insurance denials, high out-of-pocket costs, and others).
12. See generally STEPHEN P. MELEK, DANIEL PERLMAN & STODDARD DAVENPORT, ADDICTION AND
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insurance disparities with laws that mandate “parity” between the
terms of coverage for behavioral health care and other types of care,
such as medical and surgical benefits.13 To that end, statutes and
regulations passed at both the state and federal levels aim to remedy
coverage disparities by targeting network adequacy for mental health
and substance use disorder (SUD) services. 14
Although parity legislation has achieved many of its goals,
significant gaps remain. 15 Network adequacy issues provide a
particularly cogent example of this ongoing discrepancy: a
disproportionate number of patients turn to out-of-network providers
for behavioral health care compared to medical or surgical care. 16 High
rates of out-of-network care matter because out-of-network care often
entails higher out-of-pocket costs, variable provider quality, and
limited availability of services, all of which compromise access.17
MENTAL HEALTH VS. PHYSICAL HEALTH: ANALYZING DISPARITIES IN NETWORK USE AND PROVIDER
REIMBURSEMENT
RATES
(2017),
https://www.milliman.com//media/milliman/importedfiles/uploadedfiles/insight/2017/nqtldisparityanalysis.ashx
[https://perma.cc/PQ2B-9M73] (describing behavioral care providers’ low reimbursement rates and rates
of participation in insurance networks).
13. MEGAN DOUGLAS, GLENDA WRENN, SAMANTHA BENT-WEBER, LAUREN TONTI, GARRY
CARNEAL, TORIE KEETON, JESSICA GRILLO, SHARON RACHEL ET AL., KENNEDY F., EVALUATING STATE
MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION PARITY STATUTES: A TECHNICAL REPORT 4 (2018), https://pjk-wpuploads.s3.amazonaws.com/www.paritytrack.org/uploads/2018/09/KF-Evaluating-State-Mental-HealthReport-0918_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/KLN2-HZFW] (“The Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 . . . requires insurers to treat illnesses of the brain, such
as depression or substance use disorders, the same way they treat illnesses of the body, such as diabetes
or cancer. Large group health plans are required to cover mental health and substance use disorders
(MH/SUD) in a way that is no more restrictive than coverage for physical or other medical conditions.”);
SARAH GOODELL, HEALTH AFFS, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF: ENFORCING MENTAL HEALTH PARITY 1–3
(2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20151109.624272/full/healthpolicybrief_147.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ME46-8SNH].
14. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (entitled “Parity in mental health and substance use disorder [SUD]
benefits”); 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a)(2) (2016) (“Each QHP [Qualified Health Plan] issuer that uses a
provider network must ensure that the provider network . . . is sufficient in number and types of providers,
including providers that specialize in mental health and substance abuse services, to assure that all services
will be accessible without unreasonable delay . . . .”); GA. CODE. ANN. § 33-24-29(c) (2019) (“Every
insurer . . . shall be required to make available, either as part of or as an optional endorsement to all such
policies providing major medical insurance coverage[,] . . . the treatment of mental disorders, which
coverage shall be at least as extensive and provide at least the same degree of coverage . . . [as] for the
treatment of other types of physical illnesses.”).
15. HONBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 1; see GOODELL, supra note 13.
16. See generally MELEK ET AL., supra note 12 (describing disproportionate out-of-network utilization
for behavioral health care services).
17. Jane M. Zhu, Yuehan Zhang & Daniel Polsky, Networks in ACA Marketplaces Are Narrower for
Mental Health Care Than for Primary Care, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 1624, 1625 (2017).
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Thus, even though mental health parity laws have mandated that
coverage for behavioral health care services be on par with other
medical coverage, access to behavioral health care services continues
to fall short of the promise of parity because of inadequate networks
of participating behavioral health care providers. This Note discusses
the complex framework of state and federal laws governing network
adequacy and the market conditions that contribute to
underrepresentation of behavioral health care providers in insurance
networks. Part I provides a brief history of the legislation to date that
affects access to mental health care, expanding on the significance of
network adequacy by framing the problem within its broader social
context.18 Part II analyzes the shortcomings of network adequacy
regulations, the system of variable state-to-state enforcement of those
regulations, and the provider shortages that complicate efforts to
expand access.19 Finally, Part III proposes strengthening regulations
and enforcement; expanding educational programs, “telehealth”
services, and scopes of practice to address provider shortages; and
incentivizing behavioral health care providers to join insurance
networks.20
BACKGROUND
The fight to ensure parity for coverage of behavioral health
conditions has been incremental. 21 Before encountering the problems
presented by disparate coverage of behavioral health conditions,
however, individuals must seek care in the first place, and social issues
like the stigma surrounding behavioral health conditions and a lack of
health insurance inhibit people from doing so. 22 Social barriers and the
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. Taleed El-Sabawi, MHPAEA & Marble Cake: Parity & the Forgotten Frame of Federalism, 124
DICK. L. REV. 591, 594 (2020) (“It took legislators decades to incrementally enact federal
legislation . . . .”).
22. E.g., Patrick W. Corrigan & Amy C. Watson, Understanding the Impact of Stigma on People with
Mental Illness, 1 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 16, 16–18 (2002); see also ROBIN A. COHEN, AMY E. CHA,
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lag of legislation contribute to inadequate insurance networks, which
negatively impact people seeking behavioral health care. 23
A. The Push for Parity: The Historical and Social Context of
Legislative Efforts
Prior to the passage of the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) in
1996, many plans either lacked coverage for mental health services
entirely or imposed significantly more restrictive limitations on those
services than other types of health care. 24 The MHPA took the first
steps to remedy these issues by requiring parity in annual and lifetime
dollar limits for mental health benefits relative to medical or surgical
benefits.25 The legislation, however, left many other disparities intact
and did not include provisions for SUD treatments.26
Over a decade later, the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental
Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) expanded
federal parity requirements to include “treatment limits, cost sharing,
and in- and out-of-network coverage,” as well as broadening
protections to include SUDs.27 The MHPAEA also applied to a wider

MICHAEL E. MARTINEZ & EMILY P. TERLIZZI, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2019, at
1 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur202009-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7SPR7W6].
23. Zhu et al., supra note 17 (noting that out-of-network care “jeopardiz[es] access on the basis of
affordability, provider quality, and availability”).
24. AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41249, MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND THE PATIENT
PROTECTION
AND
AFFORDABLE
CARE
ACT
OF
2010,
at
1
(2011),
https://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/MHparity&mandates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5P8V-B4AB];
El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 593. Limitations on mental health coverage included the decisions of insurers
“to impose lower annual or lifetime dollar limits on mental health coverage; to limit treatment of mental
health illnesses by covering fewer hospital days and outpatient office visits; and to increase cost sharing
for mental health care services relative to medical or surgical services.” SARATA, supra.
25. SARATA, supra note 24, at 2 (“[The] [Mental Health Parity Act or] MHPA . . . requires parity in
annual and aggregate lifetime limits . . . .”).
26. Valarie K. Blake, Seeking Insurance Parity During the Opioid Epidemic, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 811,
813 n.14 (2019) (“The [MHPA] was passed in 1996 to address the parity issues for mental health services.
A similar law to address the challenges of parity in SUD would not follow for twelve years.”); GOODELL,
supra note 13, at 2 (“[T]he [Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity
Act of 2008 or] MHPAEA also applied to the treatment of substance use disorders, which the MHPA did
not address.”).
27. GOODELL, supra note 13, at 2; 26 U.S.C. § 9812.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/13

8

Williams: 404 Provider Not Found

2022]

404 PROVIDER NOT FOUND

997

array of plans than the MHPA.28 Notably, however, neither the MHPA
nor the MHPAEA actually mandate that plans provide behavioral
health benefits; they simply require that plans that offer those benefits
do so no more restrictively than they do for other types of care. 29
In 2010, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),
better known as the “Affordable Care Act” or “Obamacare,” applied
the MHPAEA to the individual market and Marketplace plans that the
ACA established. 30 Perhaps more importantly, the ACA classified
mental health and substance abuse treatment as one of its ten essential
health benefits, which constituted an important step forward for the
parity effort.31
In addition to federal legislation, all states have now passed mental
health parity statutes. 32 Although this may suggest broad parity
implementation at first glance, parity law is enforced by a “patchwork”
of state and federal regulatory agencies, and enforcement has been
minimal overall.33 This decentralized enforcement regime bears at
least some responsibility for the disparities that persist, including those
in the area of network adequacy. 34 Individuals seeking behavioral
health care, however, must overcome other barriers before they begin
to feel the effects of coverage discrepancies and inadequate
networks.35

28. GOODELL, supra note 13, at 2 (“The MHPAEA went beyond the MHPA and included Medicare
Advantage plans offered through group health plans, state and local government plans, Medicaid managed
care plans, and state Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) plans.”).
29. Id. at 1–2; DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 13.
30. GOODELL, supra note 13, at 2.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(E); see also GOODELL, supra note 13, at 2 (noting that, as a result of
classifying mental health benefits as an essential health benefit, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA) “went beyond the MHPAEA by mandating coverage instead of requiring parity only if
coverage is provided”).
32. Thomson Reuters, Mental Health and Substance Abuse Parity and Coverage Requirements, 0100
SURVEYS 41 (2019). Additionally, mental health parity statutes have been passed in the District of
Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Id.
33. GOODELL, supra note 13, at 4.
34. El-Sabawi, supra note 21, at 595; GOODELL, supra note 13, at 4; MELEK ET AL., supra note 12, at
4 (depicting high rates of out-of-network utilization for behavioral health care services throughout the
United States).
35. See generally Patrick W. Corrigan, Benjamin G. Druss & Deborah A. Perlick, The Impact of
Mental Illness Stigma on Seeking and Participating in Mental Health Care, 15 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INT. 37
(2014) (exploring the negative impact of stigma on mental health care participation).
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Stigma surrounding mental health conditions presents perhaps the
most substantial pre-access barrier to behavioral health care.36
Negative public attitudes toward mental health conditions may
adversely impact individuals’ ability to obtain treatment and
employment, which in turn harms their potential to function as fully
accepted members of society. 37 Moreover, people who suffer from
mental health conditions may internalize those public attitudes, which
can result in “self-stigma” by engendering low self-esteem or feelings
of indifference about their own conditions.38 In turn, these negative
inward attitudes may discourage people from seeking much-needed
care, and many people with serious mental health conditions ultimately
do not obtain treatment.39 Low rates of utilization in behavioral health
care are especially troubling considering that medical studies have
consistently demonstrated the effectiveness of treatment.40
Stigma, however, presents only the first hurdle. 41 Despite the ACA’s
reforms, many Americans remain without health insurance. 42 For most
of those Americans, the cost of receiving mental health treatment, or
any other kind of treatment for that matter, is prohibitive. 43 Further,

36. See Corrigan & Watson, supra note 22.
37. Id. at 17 (linking public stigma to a lack of help for those with mental illness, “social avoidance”
of mentally ill members of society, and a “deleterious impact on obtaining good jobs”).
38. Id. at 17–18. Although self-stigma in some cases may energize mental health patients by causing
them to become “righteously angry because of the prejudice that they have experienced,” thereby leading
them to “becom[e] more active participants in their treatment plan,” in many other cases, it may have a
suppressing effect. Id. at 18.
39. Corrigan et al., supra note 35, at 40, 44, 47.
40. Blake, supra note 26, at 813.
41. See HONBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 1.
42. COHEN ET AL., supra note 22 (“In the second half of 2019, 35.7 million persons of all ages (11.0%)
were uninsured—significantly higher than the first 6 months of 2019 (30.7 million, 9.5%).”). Though the
precise toll that COVID-19 has taken on the number of insured Americans is currently unclear, high
unemployment rates and information from the federal Health Insurance Marketplace support the
conclusion that more Americans have lost health insurance because of the pandemic. BUREAU OF LAB.
STAT., USDL-20-1650, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—AUGUST 2020, at 1 (2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_09042020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B7BJ-8CVW]
(indicating that the August 2020 unemployment rate of 8.4%, though falling, is over twice the rate from
August
2019);
Marketplace
Coverage
&
Coronavirus,
HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/NYS4-P9ZA].
43. JENNIFER TOLBERT, KENDAL ORGERA, NATALIE SINGER & ANTHONY DAMICO, KEY FACTS
ABOUT THE UNINSURED POPULATION 1 (2019), https://files.kff.org/attachment//fact-sheet-key-factsabout-the-uninsured-population [https://perma.cc/67N3-D9J6] (“The uninsured often face unaffordable
medical bills when they do seek care.”).
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individuals with mental health concerns lack insurance more
commonly than other patients.44 Even for those who do have health
insurance, many individuals face hindrances to receiving mental health
treatment, such as coverage denials, high out-of-pocket costs, and
problems finding behavioral health care providers within their plan’s
network.45 Mental health patients encounter these obstacles at higher
rates compared to patients seeking other care.46 And even with
insurance, patients with mental health conditions frequently seem to
have trouble locating in-network providers within reasonable distances
and without long wait times for an appointment. 47
B. A Backdrop of “Narrow Networks”
At least some of the trouble with locating in-network health care
providers is by design; insurers use “narrow networks” as a method of
containing costs.48 Although the ACA closed the door to many
measures that insurers had used to keep costs down, it left the door
open for insurers to craft increasingly narrow networks.49 Consumers

44. Kathleen Rowan, Donna D. McAlpine & Lynn A. Blewett, Access and Cost Barriers to Mental
Health Care, By Insurance Status, 1999–2010, 32 HEALTH AFFS. 1723, 1723 (2013) (“People with mental
illness are less likely to have health insurance than those without mental health problems. . . . Rachel
Garfield and colleagues found that [thirty-seven] percent of working-age adults with severe mental
illnesses were uninsured for at least part of the year, compared to [twenty-eight] percent of people without
severe mental illness.”).
45. HONBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 1–2.
46. GOODELL, supra note 13, at 4.
47. See JOHN V. JACOBI & TARA ADAMS RAGONE, SETON HALL L., CTR. FOR HEALTH & PHARM. L.
& POL’Y, ACCESS TO BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES IN MARKETPLACE PLANS IN NEW JERSEY: THE
PUZZLE OF PARITY 16 (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814596
[https://perma.cc/R6B5-YFFN] (noting that inadequacy of behavioral health care provider networks for
plans offered by the federal Marketplace was a “prominent theme” in conversations with providers and
advocates); see also HONBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 2 (describing a survey that found that a
“significant percentage of respondents” reported difficulty finding in-network behavioral health care
providers).
48. Zhu et al., supra note 17, at 1624 (describing insurers’ increased use of “narrow networks” as a
cost-cutting measure).
49. See id. (describing various cost-cutting practices that were prohibited with the passage of the ACA,
including “standardization of benefits, limits on maximum out-of-pocket spending, and community
rating”).
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now frequently encounter narrow network options on the individual
market and through employer-based coverage.50
Narrow networks enable insurers to cut costs in part by excluding
high-cost providers.51 Providers participating in these networks agree
to accept lower prices for their services in exchange for the expectation
of greater patient volume.52 Though cost-cutting measures typically go
hand-in-hand with maximizing profits, tailored networks also allow
insurers to offer lower premiums, which “remain the most important
factor in plan choice for consumers.”53 With fewer ways for insurance
providers to economize after the ACA, entirely eliminating the use of
narrow networks would curtail insurers’ ability to deliver lower
premiums.54
Nonetheless, the savings from narrow networks can come at the
price of adversely affecting access to health care. 55 Consumers who
choose a plan with a narrow network implicitly accept the trade-off of
a more restricted choice of health care providers.56 Although narrow
networks can negatively impact access to all types of care, they pose a
particularly acute problem for behavioral health care.57 Due to the
50. Tracy Anderman, What to Know About Narrow Network Health Insurance Plans, CONSUMER
REPS. (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/health-insurance/what-to-know-about-narrownetwork-health-insurance-plans/ [https://perma.cc/K8K2-UBB4] (indicating that one in five plans sold on
ACA health exchanges and one third of Medicare Advantage plans have narrow networks, and 18% of
companies with five thousand employees “offer at least one narrow network plan”).
51. Zhu et al., supra note 17, at 1624.
52. Anderman, supra note 50.
53. Zhu et al., supra note 17, at 1624. But see Leslie Read & Matt Kaye, Deloitte, What Matters Most
to the Health Care Consumer?, AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.ahip.org/whatmatters-most-to-the-health-care-consumer/ [https://perma.cc/R3TW-ZB76] (describing a survey that
suggests personalization of providers (i.e., a consumer’s familiarity and comfort with a provider) actually
outweighs economic considerations in purchasing decisions for some consumers).
54. Zhu et al., supra note 17, at 1624.
55. Id. at 1625.
56. Robert Pear, Lower Health Insurance Premiums to Come at Cost of Fewer Choices, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/health/lower-health-insurance-premiums-tocome-at-cost-of-fewer-choices.html [https://perma.cc/882E-4RRL]. Many consumers, however, appear
to be satisfied with the trade-off between price and access. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-761,
PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: MOST ENROLLEES REPORTED SATISFACTION WITH
THEIR HEALTH PLANS, ALTHOUGH SOME CONCERNS EXIST 20–21 (2016) (“While stakeholders have
expressed concerns with [narrow network] plans, consumers continue to enroll in them and indicate they
are willing to choose a plan with a narrow network to reduce their premiums.”).
57. Pear, supra note 56; SARATA, supra note 24 (“[I]n- and out-of-network coverage has often been
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potentially high expense of mental health treatment, some plans may
intentionally seek to exclude mental health providers.58
C. The Problem of Network Inadequacy
Despite attempts to specifically ensure adequate networks of
behavioral health care providers, network size continues to fall short
of legislators’ aspirations.59 In the United States between 2013 and
2015, the rate of out-of-network utilization for inpatient behavioral
care services was roughly three to four times higher than the rate for
medical and surgical benefits. 60 For outpatient services, the same
proportion was about three to six times more.61 In 2015, every state but
Nebraska saw disproportionate out-of-network utilization for
behavioral office visits.62
Moreover, the across-the-board disparities in out-of-network
utilization seem to grow each year.63 Out-of-network utilization does
not necessarily indicate network inadequacy because patients may
choose to go out of network, but the dwindling behavioral health
workforce and the scale of out-of-network utilization for behavioral
health care services suggest that a lack of patient choice—not an

variable between mental health and medical and surgical services.”); Valarie Blake, Narrow Networks,
the Very Sick, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Recalling the Purpose of Health
Insurance and Reform, 16 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 63, 95 (2015) (noting that mental health providers
“have historically raised network adequacy concerns”); GOODELL, supra note 13, at 5 (detailing various
state studies that found low psychiatrist participation in networks); Zhu et al., supra note 17.
58. MARK A. HALL & PAUL B. GINSBURG, USC-BROOKINGS SCHAEFFER INITIATIVE FOR HEALTH
POL’Y, A BETTER APPROACH TO REGULATING PROVIDER NETWORK ADEQUACY 3 (2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/regulatory-options-for-provider-networkadequacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2ZW-BCV8] (“[H]ealth plans might purposefully understaff certain
specialties in order to avoid attracting people with expensive existing conditions, such as cancer or mental
illness.”).
59. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a)(2) (2016) (“Each QHP issuer that uses a provider network must
ensure that the provider network . . . is sufficient in number and types of providers, including providers
that specialize in mental health and substance abuse services, to assure that all services will be accessible
without unreasonable delay . . . .”). See generally MELEK ET AL., supra note 12 (indicating that a much
higher rate of behavioral health care patients goes out of network for care than do their medical and
surgical counterparts).
60. MELEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 1.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 4, 4 fig.4.
63. See id. at 6 fig.6.
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abundance of it—drives the disproportionality.64 Despite the ACA and
all states’ promulgation of network adequacy requirements, these
market trends reflect a reality increasingly at odds with legislators’
aims.65
Inadequate behavioral health care networks create three primary
barriers to care: longer wait times, farther distances, and higher costs.66
Long wait times do not simply inconvenience patients; each day that
would-be patients are made to wait brings with it a higher likelihood
that they will ultimately not receive the care they need.67 According to
a 2015 study of psychiatrists’ waiting periods in three cities,
prospective patients faced an average wait time of twenty-five days

64. Id. at 1, 2; John M. Grohol, Mental Health Professionals: US Statistics 2017, PSYCHCENTRAL
(Apr.
9,
2019),
https://psychcentral.com/blog/mental-health-professionals-us-statistics-2017/
[https://perma.cc/5LU3-Q7KU] (“Psychiatry has suffered a devastating 36[%] decrease in its ranks since
2011.”); Mental Health Care Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs), KAISER FAM. FOUND.
[hereinafter Mental Health Professional Shortage Areas Table], https://www.kff.org/other/stateindicator/mental-health-care-health-professional-shortage-areas-hpsas [https://perma.cc/5WEK-53VU]
(Sept. 30, 2021) (documenting the widespread shortages of mental health providers in the United States
and all of its territories); see also Susan H. Busch & Kelly A. Kyanko, Incorrect Provider Directories
Associated with Out-Of-Network Mental Health Care and Outpatient Surprise Bills, 39 HEALTH AFFS.
975, 980–81 (2020) (“Interestingly, even among participants [of a study] who did not report any [provider
directory] inaccuracies, one in five used an out-of-network mental health provider. This suggests that there
are multiple reasons for high out-of-network use in mental health, including the desire to maintain
continuity with a provider who is no longer in network or the belief that an out-of-network provider is of
higher quality.”).
65. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 13, at 4, 13; John
V. Jacobi, Tara Adams Ragone & Kate Greenwood, Health Insurer Market Behavior After the Affordable
Care Act: Assessing the Need for Monitoring, Targeted Enforcement, and Regulatory Reform, 120 PENN
ST. L. REV. 109, 140 (2015) (noting that the ACA created the first federal network adequacy regulations
for individual and small group plans and discussing pre-ACA, state-level network adequacy regulations
for health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs)). See
generally Thomson Reuters, supra note 32 (listing parity statutes in all fifty states).
66. JACOBI & RAGONE, supra note 47, at v, 18 (describing reports of patients’ long wait times and
travel distances); Zhu et al., supra note 17 (noting that out-of-network care “jeopardiz[es] access on the
basis of affordability, provider quality, and availability”);
67. Cindy Dampier, Mental Health Care Appointments Often Come with a Long Wait. 3 Ways to Cope
While
Help
Is
Delayed,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Oct.
25,
2018,
4:35
PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/sc-fam-mental-health-wait-times-1030-story.html
[https://perma.cc/47EM-AQTR] (“[W]ait times have a very real impact. ‘For every one day of wait time,’
says [National Council for Behavioral Health] President and CEO Linda Rosenberg, ‘you lose [one]
percent of the patients—so if you have a [twenty-one]-day wait, [twenty-one] percent of the patients
seeking care just will give up and not show up.’”).
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until the first available appointment. 68 Adolescents may wait twice as
long.69
Further, inadequate networks often mean that individuals seeking
behavioral care must travel greater distances to reach an in-network
provider.70 The problem compounds in rural areas, where patients
often struggle to find behavioral health care providers close to them
because health care facilities tend to be located in more densely
populated areas.71 Uneven distributions persist despite federal attempts
to ensure a more even apportionment of providers.72 Even in nonrural
areas, providers may not be able to meet their communities’ immediate
behavioral needs. As a result, desperate patients may have no choice
but to travel to faraway places for care. 73
Additionally, inadequate networks entail higher costs for
consumers: insurers contract to pay in-network providers lower prices,
and when a patient receives out-of-network care, insurers usually pass
on at least a portion of the higher price.74 In many situations, patients

68. Monica Malowney, Sarah Keltz, Daniel Fischer & Wesley Boyd, Availability of Outpatient Care
from Psychiatrists: A Simulated-Patient Study in Three U.S. Cities, 66 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 94, 95 (2015).
69. Kenneth J. Steinman, Abigail B. Shoben, Allard E. Dembe & Kelly J. Kelleher, How Long Do
Adolescents Wait for Psychiatry Appointments?, 51 CMTY. MENTAL HEALTH J. 782, 782 (2015) (“The
median wait time [for an adolescent seeking a psychiatry appointment in Ohio] was [fifty] days . . . .”).
70. JACOBI & RAGONE, supra note 47, at 16 (“We generally heard concerns that plan networks
contained an inadequate number of appropriate [behavioral health care] providers, which meant that
patients had to wait extended periods of time or travel long distances for appointments—or simply went
without care. . . . We also heard concerns that in-network provider offices did not have flexible hours for
patients who work or were not accessible by public transportation.”).
71. See JOANNE M. CHIEDI, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
OEI-02-17-00490, PROVIDER SHORTAGES AND LIMITED AVAILABILITY OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
SERVICES IN NEW MEXICO’S MEDICAID MANAGED CARE 6, 7 (2019).
72. See 45 C.F.R. § 156.235(a)(1) (2017) (“A QHP issuer that uses a provider network must include
in its provider network a sufficient number and geographic distribution of essential community providers
(ECPs), where available, to ensure reasonable and timely access to a broad range of such providers for
low-income individuals or individuals residing in Health Professional Shortage Areas within the QHP’s
service area, in accordance with the Exchange’s network adequacy standards.”).
73. Kalter, supra note 6 (telling the story of one patient struggling with suicidal thoughts whose
parents drove her eleven hours from Michigan to the University of North Carolina to see a psychiatrist).
74. Blake, supra note 57, at 87 (“One study projects that as many as three million patients will
experience unexpected medical costs for going out-of-network each year.”); Dan Mangan, The Much
Higher Costs of “Out-of-Network” Health Care, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/30/the-muchhigher-costs-of-out-of-network-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/9ST8-PHET] (Oct. 1, 2015, 9:26 AM)
(“Private insurance plans offer customers health benefits provided by a network of doctors, hospitals and
other facilities, who in turn agree to receive negotiated reimbursement rates from the plans in exchange
for being covered by the plan.”).
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may unwittingly receive care from an out-of-network provider.75 Until
recently, providers and insurers could freely subject many of these
patients to surprise medical bills.76 Although the patients were
unaware that they were receiving care from an out-of-network
provider, insurers could still impose greater cost-sharing requirements,
and out-of-network providers could bill a patient for the difference
between the price of their services and the amount that the patient’s
insurance company would pay.77 Blame for these bills often fell on
providers and insurers—not patients—because patients based their
decisions to see a provider on insurers’ erroneous provider
directories.78
Congress banned most of these billing practices with the No
Surprises Act, which passed at the end of 2020 and became effective
on January 1, 2022.79 Before the passage of the No Surprises Act, only
75. Simon F. Haeder, David L. Weimer & Dana B. Mukamel, Surprise Billing: No Surprise in View
of
Network
Complexity,
HEALTH
AFFS.
BLOG
(June
5,
2019),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190603.704918/full/ [https://perma.cc/X2Q9-NQFB].
76. Karen Pollitz, Surprise Medical Bills, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (Mar. 2016),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-surprise-medical-bills
[https://perma.cc/6D5T-HAA4].
“‘Surprise medical bill’ is a term commonly used to describe charges arising when an insured individual
inadvertently receives care from an out-of-network provider.” Id.
77. Mangan, supra note 74 (“Customers who seek care outside of the plan’s network of providers
typically have to personally pay more for the care, because the plan either does not cover the services at
all, or it covers a much smaller share of the cost.”). Providers’ practice of billing patients for this balance
is known as “balance billing.” WEN S. SHEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10284, BALANCE BILLING:
CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND PROPOSED FEDERAL SOLUTIONS 1–2 (2019),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10284 [https://perma.cc/WPW6-69BK] (“When an
out-of-network provider treats a patient, the health plan may pay only an amount it determines is fair or
may not pay any charges if the plan does not offer out-of-network benefits. When this occurs, the
out-of-network provider may ‘balance bill’ the consumer by billing her for the difference between what
her health plan paid and what the provider charged.”).
78. Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 975 (“Patients use [provider] directories to locate an
in-network provider or to determine whether a specific provider is in the plan’s network. Patients’ use of
inaccurate information in directories may result in . . . mistaken use of an out-of-network provider (that
is, the receipt of a ‘surprise bill’) . . . .”).
79. Sara Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, Surprise Medical Bills Cost Americans Millions. Congress
Finally Banned Most of Them., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/20/upshot/surprisemedical-bills-congress-ban.html [https://perma.cc/C73F-HU2D] (Sept. 30, 2021); Surprise Medical Bills:
New Protections for Consumers Take Effect in 2022, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/private-insurance/fact-sheet/surprise-medical-bills-new-protections-for-consumerstake-effect-in-2022/ [https://perma.cc/SH2M-JDP2]. Before the No Surprises Act, federal consumer
protections against providers’ balance billing practices existed only in the context of Medicare and
Medicaid. SHEN, supra note 77, at 2 (“Federal law currently addresses balance billing only in the context
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a few states had adopted comprehensive legislation to address surprise
billing.80 The relief from Congress came too late for many patients:
one in five insured adults received a surprise medical bill between
2018 and 2020.81 Although the No Surprises Act undoubtedly provides
consolation for many behavioral health patients, the degree to which it
will alter total out-of-network behavioral health care spending remains
unclear due to uncertainty about the extent to which patients
knowingly seek out-of-network care.82
Consumers are not the only ones who bear the stress of inadequate
systems of behavioral health care delivery. Systemic failures translate
to a higher burden on the criminal justice system and emergency
departments (EDs), neither of which are well suited to assist behavioral
health patients.83 Many EDs seek to divert mental health patients as
of Medicaid, which is a cooperative federal-state program that provides health coverage to low-income
individuals, and Medicare, which provides health coverage to qualified elderly and other individuals.
Under Medicaid, providers generally cannot balance bill Medicaid beneficiaries if the providers have
already billed and accepted payment from Medicaid.”). As for insurers’ surprise billing practices, the ACA
previously only limited a plan’s cost-sharing amount for out-of-network emergency care to the plan’s
in-network rate. Id.
80. Karen Pollitz, Lunna Lopes, Audrey Kearney, Matthew Rae, Cynthia Cox, Rachel Fehr & David
Rousseau, Kaiser Fam. Found., US Statistics on Surprise Medical Billing, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 498,
498 (2020) (showing that, as of February 11, 2020, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland,
Oregon, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont had enacted “comprehensive state laws to address surprise
bills”). But see Zina Gontscharow, Four States Start 2020 with New Surprise Billing Laws, AM.’S
ESSENTIAL HOSPS. (Jan 22, 2020), https://essentialhospitals.org/policy/four-states-start-2020-newsurprise-billing-laws/ [https://perma.cc/3TWA-R6CY] (indicating that another four states—Colorado,
New Mexico, Texas, and Washington—passed laws at the beginning of 2020 that govern surprise medical
bills).
81. Pollitz et al., supra note 80.
82. See Gary Claxton, Matthew Rae, Cynthia Cox & Larry Levitt, An Analysis of Out-of-Network
Claims in Large Employer Health Plans, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS. TRACKER (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/an-analysis-of-out-of-network-claims-in-large-employerhealth-plans/#item-start [https://perma.cc/F3QZ-PJHQ] (showing that enrollees using outpatient mental
health services are significantly more likely to have a claim from an out-of-network provider); see also
Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64(suggesting that mental health patients may have multiple reasons to
knowingly seek care from an out-of-network provider, including a desire to continue treatment with a
formerly in-network provider or a belief that an out-of-network provider furnishes higher quality care).
83. Kalter, supra note 6. See Richard Williams, Addressing Mental Health in the Justice System,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2015), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/addressing-mental-health-in-the-justice-system.aspx [https://perma.cc/K7KW-YG96] (“Fifty-six
percent of state prisoners and 64[%] of jail inmates have had a mental health issue.”); see also Pod Save
America, “Kamala at Me, Bro.” (Debate Recap!), CROOKED MEDIA, at 67:12 (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://crooked.com/podcast/kamala-at-me-bro-debate-recap/
[https://perma.cc/X9YW-4DPY]
(providing insight into Texas’s problems with access to health care and their implications for the justice
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quickly as possible.84 Yet, in unwitting defiance of the limited abilities
of EDs, behavioral health patients increasingly turn up for help.85 One
in eight ED visits relates to mental health or substance use issues.86
Large volumes of behavioral patients also impact EDs’ capacities to
care for other patients with life-threatening physical conditions. 87
Expanding access to behavioral health care outside of EDs would
reduce their share of the burden.88 To address inadequate networks,
their constituent causes and the landscape of legislative responses
designed to address them require examination.
II. ANALYSIS
Effective regulation of network adequacy requires a delicate
balancing act; several market behaviors and conditions contribute to
network inadequacy.89 Five categories of tools used to regulate
system; former U.S. Representative Beto O’Rourke said, “[W]hen [you are] talking about access to health
care, [Texas is] the least insured state in the country; [the] number one provider of mental health care is
the county jail system; [the] largest inpatient mental health care facility is the Harris County jail . . . .”).
84. Zeller, supra note 8, at 3 (“Unfortunately, many systems have sought to divert psychiatric patients
from the ED as if they do not belong there.”); Judy Schwartz Haley, Mental Health Emergency: What to
Expect in the ER, DIGNITY HEALTH (July 22, 2017), https://www.dignityhealth.org/articles/mental-healthemergency-what-to-expect-in-the-er [https://perma.cc/3HC8-FJLC] (“In some cases, [mental health
patients] may be released from the ER and told to follow up with a mental health professional.”); see also,
e.g., Jane Flasch, Law May Have Forced Hospital to Release Daniel Prude Hours Before Fatal RPD
Encounter, WHAM-TV (Sept. 8, 2020), https://13wham.com/news/local/law-may-have-forced-hospitalto-release-daniel-prude-hours-before-fatal-rpd-encounter [https://perma.cc/9HEH-CUY3] (reporting that,
out of the 7,000 mental hygiene transports that had occurred in Monroe County, New York, in 2020 by
September, only “about one of every four patients [was] ever admitted”). But see AUDREY J. WEISS,
MARGUERITE L. BARRETT, KEVIN C. HESLIN & CAROL STOCKS, TRENDS IN EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT
VISITS INVOLVING MENTAL AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS, 2006–2013, at 1 (2016),
https://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/reports/statbriefs/sb216-Mental-Substance-Use-Disorder-ED-VisitTrends.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6ZB-M36E]; Zeller, supra note 8. Compared to all other types of ED visits,
mental and substance use disorder ED visits are more than twice as likely to result in hospital admissions.
WEISS ET AL., supra; Zeller, supra note 8. These admissions put a strain on hospitals’ already limited
number of inpatient beds. See Zeller, supra note 8, at 3.
85. Kalter, supra note 6 (“ED visits related to mental health and substance-use issues increased more
than 44% between 2006 and 2014 . . . with suicidal ideation visits growing by nearly 415%.”).
86. Id.; Zeller, supra note 8, at 3.
87. Zeller, supra note 8, at 3.
88. See Kalter, supra note 6 (“‘Given the lack of capacity in mental health care delivery systems, a
substantial volume continues to fall on emergency departments as the de facto primary care,’ [Robert
Trestman, MD, PhD, Chair of Psychiatry at the Virginia Tech Carilion School of Medicine] notes.”).
89. See HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 6 (“Current lawmakers are understandably cautious
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network adequacy have, to date, fallen short of their aspirations in the
behavioral health specialties: (1) qualitative standards, (2) quantitative
standards, (3) “any willing provider” laws (AWP), (4) parity
enforcement in behavioral health reimbursement rates, and (5)
provider directory requirements. 90 On the supply side, severe shortages
of behavioral health care providers inhibit the efficacy of network
adequacy regulations.91 Efforts to bridge the supply-demand gap,
namely financial assistance programs for medical students and bids to
expand telehealth services, have seen limited success so far.92
A. The Inadequacies of Network Adequacy Regulations
To mitigate the risks that narrow insurance networks present to
consumers, all states and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS)—pursuant to ACA—promulgate regulations targeting
network adequacy.93 Ultimately, network adequacy standards aim to
ensure access to care. 94 These standards fall into two categories:
qualitative and quantitative. 95 On the one hand, qualitative approaches
supply broad, ambiguous standards, such as requiring plans to include
enough providers to make services available to enrollees “without
unreasonable delay.”96 On the other hand, quantitative standards
establish specific thresholds for network capacity, provider
distribution, and appointment wait times that insurance networks must
meet.97
HHS opted for the qualitative approach for Marketplace plans,
creating a “baseline” that leaves room for states to regulate according

about adopting more stringent network adequacy rules that might repeat perceived mistakes from the past,
or otherwise squelch beneficial marketplace developments.”).
90. See infra Part II.A.
91. See infra Part II.B.
92. See infra Part II.B.
93. Blake, supra note 57, at 69 (“The [ACA] and the states regulate narrow networks through network
adequacy provisions, which require plans to provide reasonable access to covered benefits through
provider-to-patient ratios, geographic limits, and other criteria.”).
94. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 20.
95. Id. at 6.
96. 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a)(2) (2016); HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 6–7.
97. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 7–8, 22; Jacobi et al., supra note 65.
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to their needs.98 Many states simply extend HHS’s ambiguity, which
does little on its own to move the needle on network adequacy.99 Other
states have tried to shore up the ACA’s slack by taking the quantitative
approach, but the ability of quantitative standards to buttress network
adequacy has also been limited. 100 Due to these limitations, most states
that employ quantitative standards also use qualitative ones. 101
Inadequate enforcement of both types of standards, however,
contributes to their fecklessness to date. 102 Although many states
require insurers to cover out-of-network care at in-network rates when
enrollees do not have timely access to in-network services, patients
and their providers typically must show that the care sought is both
unavailable in network and medically necessary—a difficult task for
behavioral health care services.103 Moreover, out-of-network
behavioral health care providers may still bill a privately insured
patient who chooses to go out of network for the balance between the
98. § 156.230(a)(2) (providing that provider networks on the federal Marketplace must be able to
supply mental health and substance use disorder services “without unreasonable delay” but giving no
guidance as to what constitutes “unreasonable delay”); Jacobi et al., supra note 65, at 142 (“Neither the
federal statute nor regulations define key terms, like ‘unreasonable delay,’ instead ‘leaving the
implementation of specific standards either to insurers or to the states.’”); Blake, supra note 57, at 69
(“The federal government creates a baseline upon which the states can build more stringent and locally
relevant guidelines that reflect their unique health care markets and level of competition.”).
99. Jacobi et al., supra note 65 (discussing “broad” and “subjective” state standards for network
adequacy, such as “reasonable access to providers”).
100. See infra Part II.A.2.
101. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 8 (“A quantitative approach, however, faces a number of
difficulties, on account of which most states with quantitative metrics still also employ qualitative
standards.”).
102. AM. MED. ASS’N, IMPROVING THE HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE: NETWORK ADEQUACY
1–2, https://www.ama-assn.org/media/11171/download [https://perma.cc/ZAF7-M8B9]; see also MELEK
ET AL., supra note 12, at 2 fig.1, 4 fig.4 (illustrating disparate levels of out-of-network utilization for
behavioral health care services).
103. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 13 (“One obvious remedy for patients who do not have
timely access to services they need is to require insurers to pay or reimburse the cost of seeking care out
of network. This is required by the [National Alliance of Insurance Commissioner (NAIC)]’s Model Act,
and by many (but not all) states.” (citations omitted)); e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
28, § 1300.67.2.2(c)(7)(B) (2019) (“Plans shall arrange for the provision of specialty services from
specialists outside the plan’s contracted network if unavailable within the network, when medically
necessary for the enrollee’s condition.”). See generally Darcy Lockman, Is My Work “Medically
Necessary”?: How Insurance Companies Try to Get Around Rules for Mental Health Care, SLATE (Jan.
12, 2015, 8:35 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2015/01/medically-necessary-psychotherapyinsurance-companies-try-to-evade-mental-health-parity-rules.html
[https://perma.cc/TCU5-9F6A]
(describing one psychiatrist’s difficulties with denials of coverage for her patients’ psychotherapy because
of medical necessity).
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price of the services rendered and the amount the patient’s insurer
agrees to pay.104
1. Qualitative Standards
Qualitative standards often come hand-in-hand with relatively lax
methods for measuring compliance. Most commonly, state regulators
simply require that insurers articulate a plan for determining the
adequacy of their networks.105 These regulators often do not conduct
routine audits, relying mostly on consumer complaints to monitor the
sufficiency of networks.106 But the extent to which consumers file
these complaints, as well as the complaints’ cogency, appears
uncertain: unless patients or providers seek prior authorization from an
insurer to go out of network, no “decision point” for review exists. 107
Ultimately, these methods mostly leave it to insurers to police their
own compliance.108 Although some states take a more proactive
enforcement approach, the widespread combination of toothless
standards and toothless enforcement has no doubt contributed to
inadequate representation of behavioral health specialists in insurance
networks.109

104. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 20 n.69 (“Regulation of network adequacy under Medicare
and Medicaid avoids [the] problem [of providers using strict adequacy rules to force insurers to agree to
inflated prices] because providers are not permitted to freely ‘balance bill’ those beneficiaries. But, under
private insurance, providers can charge ‘whatever the market will bear.’”).
105. Id. at 7.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 15 (“One difficulty in making external review routinely available for network inadequacy
is needing a clear triggering event to seek review. . . . For network access, the need arises simply from a
patient’s inability to secure an adequate, timely appointment or referral. Unless a patient or provider seeks,
and is denied, prior authorization, there is no crystallized decision point.”).
108. Id. at 7 (“Once regulators approve an insurer’s network adequacy plan, typically they then leave it
to insurers to self-monitor their own compliance.”).
109. See id. (“This more passive or reactive regulatory approach is not at all universal; many states are
more prescriptive and proactive. However, self-certification under a general qualitative standard is the
approach still used by almost half the states in the private insurance market.”).
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2. Quantitative Standards
In addition to proactive network adequacy enforcement, states may
also lay out their requirements more clearly. 110 The quantitative
standards that some states employ can be divided primarily into three
categories: (a) geographic criteria, (b) appointment wait-time
requirements, and (c) provider-to-enrollee ratios.111
a. Geographic Criteria
Of the three primary quantitative standards, states use geographic
criteria most widely.112 The geographic criteria typically establish that
network providers must be located within a prescribed number of miles
from a percentage of the enrollees’ residences or the plan’s geographic
boundaries, or that carriers must meet the National Committee for
Quality Assurance’s geographic standards. 113 Geographic
requirements vary widely from state to state. 114 Some states establish
different standards for different plan types and for urban and rural
areas, though differences in population and demand for services often
justify different standards.115 Of the twenty-six states that had
110. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., SPOTLIGHT ON NETWORK ADEQUACY STANDARDS FOR SUBSTANCE USE
DISORDER AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 15 (2020) https://www.lac.org/assets/files/NetworkAdeqaucy-Spotlight-final-UTO.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HYJ-U5N7] (“Quantitative metrics create greater
accountability and uniformity across health plans and reduce the ability of plans to define and monitor
their own performance under a qualitative standard.”).
111. DRUG POL’Y & PUB. STRATEGIES CLINIC, FIFTY-STATE SURVEY: NETWORK ADEQUACY
QUANTITATIVE STANDARDS: GEOGRAPHIC CRITERIA, APPOINTMENT WAIT TIMES &
PROVIDER/ENROLLEE
RATIOS
1–2
(2016),
https://insurance.maryland.gov/Consumer/Documents/agencyhearings/UMD-LawSchoolDrugPolicyClinic-NetAdqSurvey10182016.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6FP-RAS2]; Jacobi et al., supra note
65, at 140–41.
112. LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 1; DRUG POL’Y & PUB. STRATEGIES CLINIC, supra note
111 (showing that, out of twenty-three states that employed quantitative network requirements in August
2016, twenty-one of them used geographic standards, twelve adopted wait-time requirements, and nine
adopted provider-to-enrollee ratios).
113. DRUG POL’Y & PUB. STRATEGIES CLINIC, supra note 111, at 3–27.
114. See id. at 3–24.
115. Id. at 5–6, 13–14, 21–22 (showing Texas’s differing standards for HMOs and PPOs and listing
Colorado and Nevada’s geographic requirements). In Colorado, geographic requirements for some types
of providers range from five miles in the most densely populated metro areas to one hundred miles or
more in the most remote areas. Id. at 5–6. In Nevada, limits are expressed in terms of maximum travel
times and range from ten minutes in the most densely populated areas to 145 minutes in the most remote
areas. Id. at 13–14.
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established geographic criteria as of May 2020, fewer than half used
standards that applied specifically to mental health and SUD
treatment.116
In theory, the utility of geographic criteria lies in their capacity to
combat disparate concentrations of behavioral health care providers.117
Geo-mapping programs have made implementation and compliance
determinations easier in recent years, which may explain their
prevalence relative to other quantitative standards.118 In practice,
however, the states that present the direst need for services and the
greatest challenges to access often use accommodating standards,
which may simply reflect the inherent tension between those states’
desire to expand access and their implicit acknowledgment that they
lack the providers to do so.119
b. Appointment Wait-Time Requirements
The second most common standards that states impose are
appointment wait-time requirements.120 These regulations aim to
ensure that any enrollee in a plan that falls under the purview of the

116. LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 8 (listing twelve states which have adopted precise
geographic standards that specifically apply the treatment of mental health disorders and SUDs:
California, Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont).
117. See, e.g., CHIEDI, supra note 71, at 7–8, 8 exhibit 2.
118. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 9 (“Geo-mapping programs now make it feasible to
determine how close (either by time or distance) subscribers are to providers . . . .”).
119. Compare Suicide Mortality by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR.
FOR
HEALTH STAT., https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/suicide-mortality/suicide.htm
[https://perma.cc/MM89-SXP3] (Feb. 11, 2021) (showing New Mexico as the state with the
second-highest rate of suicide by population), and CHIEDI, supra note 71, at 7–8, 8 exhibit 2 (detailing
irregular distribution of behavioral health care providers in New Mexico), with N.M. CODE
R. § 13.10.22(A)(4) (LexisNexis 2019) (outlining practices that health care plans should employ to ensure
“reasonable and reliable access,” including to “attempt to provide at least one licensed medical specialist
in those specialties that are generally available in the geographic area served, taking into consideration
the urban or rural nature of the service area, the geographic location of each covered person, and the type
of specialty care needed” (emphasis added)).
120. LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 8–9 (indicating that, as of May 2020, twenty-six states
have adopted geographic standards, seventeen states have adopted appointment wait-time standards, and
thirteen states have adopted provider-to-enrollee ratios); DRUG POL’Y & PUB. STRATEGIES CLINIC, supra
note 111, at 1–2 (showing that, out of twenty-three states that employed quantitative network requirements
in August 2016, twenty-one adopted geographic standards, twelve adopted wait-time requirements, and
nine adopted provider-to-enrollee ratios).
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regulation can receive timely access to care. 121 Like geographic
requirements, maximum appointment wait times can vary widely
depending on the state and type of care. 122 These requirements may
also include mandating hours of operation for certain types of care. 123
Some studies provide good reason to doubt insurers’ compliance
with appointment wait-time requirements, particularly for behavioral
health conditions.124 In Texas, for example, a state regulation last
amended in 2013 requires preferred provider organizations (PPOs) to
“ensure that routine care is available and accessible from preferred
providers . . . within
two
weeks
for
behavioral
health
125
conditions . . . .”
Nonetheless, a 2015 study of psychiatrist
appointment wait times in Houston (along with two other cities outside
of Texas), whose findings encompassed PPOs, reflected average wait
times of twenty-five days—more than twice the length of time required
by the regulation.126 Comparisons of states that use appointment
wait-time requirements with states that do not, however, may better
illuminate the impact of these standards; for instance, wait times for
psychiatrist appointments in Ohio, which does not employ
appointment wait-time standards, can be nearly twice as long as in
Houston.127
121. Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 981 (describing these requirements as “timely access
standards”).
122. See DRUG POL’Y & PUB. STRATEGIES CLINIC, supra note 111, at 3–24.
123. Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Health Benefit Plan Network Access and Adequacy Model Act
74 § 5(B)(6) (2015); DRUG POL’Y & PUB. STRATEGIES CLINIC, supra note 111, at 11, 13, 20 (showing
Mississippi, Nebraska, and North Dakota as three states that impose hours-of-operation requirements as
their only quantitative standard).
124. Compare, e.g., Malowney et al., supra note 68 (finding twenty-five-day average wait times to see
a psychiatrist in Houston for simulated patients with preferred provider organization (PPO) coverage),
with 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3704(f)(10)(B) (2013) (requiring PPOs to “ensure that routine care is
available and accessible from preferred providers . . . within two weeks for behavioral health conditions”).
125. § 3.3704(f)(10)(B).
126. Malowney et al., supra note 68. The study’s methods involved calling psychiatrists in three cities
and posing as “patient[s] claiming to have one of three coverage types: [Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS)]
PPO, Medicare, or self-pay.” Id. at 94. Although the study’s authors “were able to obtain appointments
more frequently by using BCBS or self-pay compared with Medicare, this difference was not significant.”
Id. at 95. The study did show, however, that Houston psychiatrists were more likely than psychiatrists
from the other two cities to answer calls and book appointments, though Houston psychiatrists were less
likely to return calls. Id.
127. LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 8 (presenting a list of all states that use appointment
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c. Provider-to-Enrollee Ratios or Minimum Number of
Providers
Provider-to-enrollee ratios or minimum number of providers
requirements comprise the most seldomly enacted quantitative
standards group.128 Populous states seemingly tend to use these
standards more frequently than their more sparsely populated
counterparts.129 Despite relatively infrequent imposition of these
standards, the prominence of provider-to-enrollee ratios in the
National Alliance of Insurance Commissioner’s (NAIC) Health
Benefit Plan Network Access and Adequacy Model Act (Model Act)
suggests that they are an important measure of a plan’s ability to meet
the needs of its members. 130 As of December 2019, however, only
three states had adopted NAIC’s Model Act, and only thirteen states
had
promulgated
provider-to-enrollee
or
131
minimum-number-of-providers standards as of May 2020. Of those
thirteen states, only five had requirements that applied specifically to
behavioral health care providers.132
Much like the other two quantitative network adequacy standards,
minimum ratios do not appear to be single-handedly effective in

wait-time standards, which does not include Ohio). Compare Malowney et al., supra note 68
(demonstrating average wait times of twenty-five days), with Steinman et al., supra note 69, at 782 (“The
median wait time [for an adolescent seeking a psychiatry appointment in Ohio] was 50 days . . . .”).
128. LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 8–9 (indicating that, as of May 2020, twenty-six states
have adopted geographic standards, seventeen have adopted appointment wait-time standards, and thirteen
have adopted provider-to-enrollee ratios); DRUG POL’Y & PUB. STRATEGIES CLINIC, supra note 111
(showing that, out of twenty-three states that employed quantitative network requirements in August 2016,
twenty-one used geographic standards, twelve adopted wait-time requirements, and nine adopted
provider-to-enrollee ratios).
129. Compare DRUG POL’Y & PUB. STRATEGIES CLINIC, supra note 111, at 2 (listing California, New
Jersey, and New York as three of the nine states using provider-to-enrollee ratios), with States—Ranked
by Size and Population, INTERNET PUB. LIB., https://www.ipl.org/div/stateknow/popchart.html
[https://perma.cc/T3Z3-35A8] (ranking California as the most populous state, New York as the third most
populous, and New Jersey as the eleventh most populous according to 2010 Census Bureau data).
130. Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Health Benefit Plan Network Access and Adequacy Model Act
74 § 5(B)(1)–(2) (2015).
131. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, STATE LEGISLATIVE BRIEF: THE NAIC NETWORK ADEQUACY
MODEL
ACT
(2019),
https://www.naic.org/documents/cmte_legislative_liaison_brief_network_adequacy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A83G-2AJH]; LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 9.
132. LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 9 (Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, and New York).
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expanding access to affordable behavioral health care. 133 The five
states that use behavioral-health-specific ratios have among the highest
percentages of out-of-network utilization for behavioral health care
services.134 A recent uptick in the number of states that apply these
standards, however, may signal that state regulators increasingly see
access-expanding potential in provider-to-enrollee ratios.135
d. Lingering Flaws in Quantitative Standards and Their
Enforcement
Overall, no single quantitative standard or combination of standards
seems to serve as the holy grail of network regulation.136 If a state does
not have enough providers to meet the need for behavioral health care,
imposing quantitative standards will simply ensure networks’
noncompliance.137 Perhaps this certain failure explains why many
states do not use quantitative standards.138 Among states that do, little
consensus exists about how to quantify “reasonable access to care.”139
133. Compare id. (listing Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, and New York as the five states with
behavioral-health-specific provider requirements), with MELEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 fig.4 (indicating
relatively high rates of out-of-network utilization in Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, and New York).
134. MELEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 fig.4 (indicating high rates of out-of-network utilization in
Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, and New York); LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 9.
135. Compare LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 9 (listing five states that, as of May 2020, have
adopted provider-to-enrollee ratios or minimum-number-of-provider requirements for mental health and
SUD services: Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, and New York), with DRUG POL’Y & PUB.
STRATEGIES CLINIC, supra note 111, at 5–8, 10 (revealing only three states adopted provider-to-enrollee
ratios or minimum-number-of-providers requirements for mental health and SUD services by August
2016: Colorado, Delaware, and Maine).
136. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 22 (“To ensure the adequacy of provider networks, neither
general qualitative standards (‘sufficient to avoid unreasonable delay’) nor quantitative standards
(specified capacity, provider distribution, or wait times) are sufficient, either alone or in combination.
Qualitative standards are too general to be self-enforcing, and quantitative standards can be too complex
or inflexible. Both kinds of standards are designed more for threshold entry into the market as a whole
than for resolving patients’ rights in particular cases.”). Compare LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110,
at 1 (“Twenty-nine . . . states have adopted at least one quantitative metric to define network adequacy for
state-regulated private insurance plans.”), with MELEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 fig.4 (showing high
rates of out-of-network utilization throughout the United States).
137. See Kayt Sukel, Dealing with the Shortage of Rural Physicians, MED. ECON., Aug. 29, 2019, at
18,
19,
https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/dealing-shortage-rural-physicians
[https://perma.cc/5NKS-E77G] (discussing shortages of providers in rural areas).
138. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 4 exhibit 1.
139. Id. at 9 (“Another difficulty presented by quantitative standards is determining what is the
appropriate standard. There is not a clear evidence-based consensus on what provider-population ratios,
drive times, or wait times are minimally adequate.”); Zhu et al., supra note 17, at 1630.
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Sparse application and nearly nonexistent enforcement have rendered
quantitative requirements largely ineffective.140 Further, critics of the
quantitative approach have pointed out that quantitative limitations
“may only demonstrate that a network is adequate at one point in time
and may not adequately account for geographic and provider
variability.”141 Whatever their flaws, these three quantitative measures
serve as some of the few tools and guidelines for evaluating and
enforcing behavioral network adequacy with specificity. 142 They do
not provide the only tools, however, for addressing access to care. 143
3. “Any Willing Provider” Laws
In addition to quantitative standards, over half of the states have
passed AWP laws to combat shortages and irregular distribution of
many kinds of providers.144 AWP laws prohibit networks from
excluding or refusing services from any provider located in the
geographical area covered by the plan so long as “the provider is
willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation established
by the health insurer.”145 Perhaps due to the particular provider
140. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 17 (“Even in states with quantitative standards, most
states rely on only one quantitative metric, and some do not apply standards uniformly to various insurance
products. Further, most states do not engage in rigorous, ongoing monitoring or taking meaningful
enforcement actions.”).
141. Id. at 15.
142. See Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 981 (“To assess whether insurers have provided patients
with sufficient in-network providers, states rely on a variety of network adequacy measures, ranging from
geographic access, provider-to-enrollee ratios, and timely access standards.”); JOANN VOLK, MAANASA
KONA, MADELINE O’BRIEN, CHRISTINA LECHNER GOE & JAMES MAYHEW, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND.,
EQUAL TREATMENT: A REVIEW OF MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ENFORCEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 18 (2020),
https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/EqualTreatmentMentalHealthParityCalifornia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N86C-LWNF] (“Regulators in California review provider networks for compliance with
regulatory standards regarding timely access to appointments, geographic access, and ratios of providers
to enrollees, but they do not currently review provider networks for compliance with [the Mental Health
Parity and Addiction Equity Act’s (MHPAEA)] [nonquantitative treatment limitation (NQTL)]
requirements.”).
143. See THOMAS C. FOX, CAROL COLBORN LOEPERE & JOSEPH W. METRO, HEALTH CARE FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS MANUAL § 11.36 (2021).
144. Id. at §§ 11.36–.37; Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 465–66 (2011).
145. Tovino, supra note 144, at 465; FOX ET AL., supra note 143, at §§ 11.36–.37; Ashley Noble, Any
Willing or Authorized Providers, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 5, 2014),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/any-willing-or-authorized-providers.aspx [https://perma.cc/E8LG-
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shortages in rural areas, a nearly complete overlap exists between the
states that have passed AWP laws and the most rural states in the
country.146
Proponents of AWP laws have argued that the laws protect patient
choice and ensure that consumers have access to the highest quality
providers.147 These laws have been fiercely challenged, however, for
undermining one of the central cost-saving tenets of narrow networks:
insurers’ ability to negotiate better prices with providers in exchange
for a higher volume of patients. 148 Opponents argue that AWP statutes
weaken insurers’ bargaining power by stripping them of control over
the breadth of their networks.149 Further, these laws tend to weaken
competition among insurers in a given area by disincentivizing
competitive pricing.150 Unsurprisingly, providers tend to favor these
statutes the most, and critics argue the laws have done more to help
providers than to increase access for patients.151
Yet the impact of AWP statutes on the field of behavioral health
appears limited; although some states employ broad AWP laws, most
apply only to pharmacies or pharmacists. 152 To date, very few states
PAYP] (listing twenty-seven states that had passed “any willing provider” laws (AWP) by 2014); e.g.,
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b(c)(2) (2020).
146. Sukel, supra note 137 (discussing the “acute” shortage of primary care providers in rural areas).
Compare Noble, supra note 145 (listing states that had passed AWP laws by 2014), with Rural States Are
Almost Entirely Ignored Under Current State-by-State System, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE [hereinafter Rural
States Almost Entirely Ignored], https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/rural-states-are-almost-entirelyignored-under-current-state-state-system [https://perma.cc/T4C4-REYE] (cataloging the most rural states
in the country according to data from the 2010 census). Since 2014, Vermont, the second most rural state
in the nation, has also passed its own behavioral-care-specific AWP law. § 4089b(c)(2); Rural States
Almost Entirely Ignored, supra.
147. Blake, supra note 57, at 99 n.209.
148. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 5–6 (“[AWP] laws make it difficult for insurers to funnel a
greater volume of patients to a smaller set of select providers as a way to negotiate the best prices.”);
Anderman, supra note 50 (“[I]nsurers that offer [narrow network plans] work with a smaller pool of
doctors, hospitals, and treatment centers, who agree to a lower price for services with the expectation that
they will get greater patient volume.”).
149. Blake, supra note 57, at 98–99, 99 n.209.
150. William J. Bahr, Although Offering More Freedom to Choose, “Any Willing Provider” Legislation
Is the Wrong Choice, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 557, 585 (1997) (“[AWP] statutes undermine the incentive of
managed care organizations to set competitive prices. . . . Thus, a state that adopts any [AWP] statutes
will have less competition among the managed care organizations.”).
151. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 5–6; Blake, supra note 57, at 99 n.209.
152. FOX ET AL., supra note 143, at § 11.37 (“Although some state statutes apply across the board to a
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seem to have passed AWP laws that specifically encompass behavioral
health care providers.153 The effects of a broad AWP statute, however,
may bleed over into the area of behavioral health if the state also
mandates that insurers offer either minimal or optional behavioral
health coverage.154
4. Behavioral Health Care Providers’ Low Reimbursement Rates
and Network Participation
Even if AWP statutes were more frequently applied to behavioral
health, their limitation might swallow the rule: behavioral health care
providers often do not seem willing to meet insurers’ terms and
conditions.155 So far, regulations have been unable to guarantee
insurance reimbursement rates that adequately incentivize behavioral
health care providers to participate in insurance networks.156 The
financial equation, which includes market conditions that further stack
the deck against participation, explains behavioral health care
providers’ eschewal of insurance networks: they stand to profit more
by staying out.157 As a result, many behavioral health care providers

broad array of providers, most apply only to pharmacies[,] [] pharmacists[,] [or both].”); see also Jeffrey
S. Baird, States’ Any Willing Provider Laws, MEDTRADE EAST (Oct. 26, 2019),
https://medtrade.com/news/billing-reimbursement/states-any-willing-provider-laws/
[https://perma.cc/U4S4-FW74] (listing many state AWP statutes that apply only to pharmacists).
153. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089b(c)(2) (2020); see also Baird, supra note 152 (noting West
Virginia’s AWP statute as the only of twenty-seven to apply specifically to behavioral health care
providers, though Wyoming’s applies to all providers).
154. Compare Richard Cauchi & Karmen Hanson, Mental Health Benefits: State Laws Mandating or
Regulating,
NAT’L
CONF.
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Dec.
30,
2015),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-benefits-state-mandates.aspx
[https://perma.cc/NL5U-KJXH] (describing “[m]andated offering laws” and noting “[m]any state laws
require that some level of coverage be provided for mental illness, serious mental illness, substance abuse
or a combination thereof”), with Baird, supra note 152 (illustrating how AWP provisions of states like
Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Utah apply more broadly than the provisions of other states), and
FOX ET AL., supra note 143, at § 11.37 (“[S]ome state statutes apply across the board to a broad array of
providers . . . .”).
155. See generally Zhu et al., supra note 17 (reporting disproportionately low rates of network
participation among behavioral health care providers compared to primary care physicians).
156. See infra Part II.A.4.
157. See Robert Pear, Fewer Psychiatrists Seen Taking Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/us/politics/psychiatrists-less-likely-to-accept-insurance-studyfinds.html [https://perma.cc/497X-H4AV] (“[M]any psychiatrists may have so much demand for their
services that they do not need to accept insurance.”).
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opt not to participate in any insurance networks whatsoever.158 In other
words, these providers only accept clientele who can afford to pay out
of pocket.159 A predominantly self-funded model poses obvious
difficulties for low-income individuals and diminishes access to
services for individuals who may need it most.160
The financial dynamic for psychiatrists stems from failed
reimbursement regulations and several market factors.161 First, more
psychiatrists choose to own their own practice than do physicians from
any other discipline. 162 Unsurprisingly, these high rates of ownership
flow from the potential to earn higher salaries: psychiatrists stand to
make more money as solo practitioners than with any other established
medical group or hospital. 163 Although solo practices present obvious
158. VOLK ET AL., supra note 142 (“[L]ow reimbursement rates . . . discourage [behavioral health care]
providers from participating in networks.”); Zhu et al., supra note 17. In the Zhu, Zhang & Polsky study,
only 21.4% of mental health providers participated in an ACA Marketplace network. Id. at 1627.
159. HONBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 3 (“Compounding the problem of mental health workforce
shortages is the reality that many practicing psychiatrists do not accept health insurance, confining their
clientele to people with the resources to pay out of pocket. A recent study published in JAMA Psychiatry
revealed that only 55% of psychiatrists accepted insurance in 2009–2010 as compared to 88.7% among
physicians in other medical specialties.”).
160. JOHN V. JACOBI, TARA ADAMS RAGONE & KATE GREENWOOD, SETON HALL CTR. FOR HEALTH
& PHARM. L. & POL’Y, INTEGRATION OF BEHAVIORAL AND PHYSICAL HEALTH CARE: LICENSING AND
REIMBURSEMENT
BARRIERS
AND
OPPORTUNITIES
IN
NEW
JERSEY
60
(2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802830 [https://perma.cc/632M-7SCM] (“[T]he
behavioral health system is fragmented, underfunded, and can be difficult to access, particularly for
low-income persons.”); see also Daphna Levinson, Matthew D. Lakoma, Maria Petukhova, Michael
Schoenbaum, Alan M. Zaslavsky, Matthias Angemeyer, Guilherme Borges, Ronny Bruffaerts et al.,
Associations of Serious Mental Illness with Earnings: Results from the WHO World Mental Health
Surveys, 197 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 114, 118 (2010) (“This finding of a strong association between mental
disorders and low earnings adds to a growing body of evidence that the impaired functioning associated
with mental disorders carries an enormous societal burden.”).
161. See infra Part II.A.4.
162. CAROL K. KANE, PHD, AM. MED. ASS’N, POLICY RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES: UPDATED DATA ON
PHYSICIAN PRACTICE ARRANGEMENTS: PHYSICIAN OWNERSHIP DROPS BELOW 50 PERCENT 4 (2017),
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/health-policy/PRP-2016physician-benchmark-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY6J-GNCY] (“Psychiatry had the greatest
percentage of physicians in solo practice, 31.9[%] in 2016.”).
163. Carol Peckham, Medscape Psychiatrists Compensation Report 2015, MEDSCAPE (Apr. 21, 2015),
https://www.medscape.com/features/slideshow/compensation/2015/psychiatry#page=10
[https://perma.cc/BU3H-MQLJ] (“Psychiatrists in office-based solo practices make the most ($252,000),
followed by multispecialty groups ($229,000). Those who earn the least money are in academic or
government centers ($188,000) and hospitals ($207,000).”). The trends in the salaries of solo-practitioner
psychiatrists do not apply equally across all types of physicians. See, e.g., Jai Parekh & David Goldman,
Group
Practice
vs.
Solo
Practice,
HEALIO
(Mar.
26,
2015),
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benefits for psychiatrists, the benefits are less obvious for their
patients.164 Partly due to having fewer staff to handle insurance billing,
solo practitioners accept insurance more infrequently than any other
kind of psychiatric practice. 165
Further, due to the nature of psychotherapy, psychiatry
appointments last longer than other types of medical visits, meaning
psychiatrists cannot see as many patients per day—and thus cannot bill
for as many services—as other providers.166 But high demand for
psychiatric services leaves psychiatrists free to see only those patients
who can afford to pay out of pocket rather than deal with the
cumbersome documentation necessary for insurance billing
processes.167 Indeed, providers cite “onerous health plan processes for
authorizing payment” and “burdensome contracting terms” as major
deterrents of network participation. 168

https://www.healio.com/news/ophthalmology/20150326/j241_3306_02_news_print_2
[https://perma.cc/KR2Y-G5NJ] (“In ophthalmology, office-based single-specialty group providers earn
an average of $325,000 annually, while office-based solo practitioners earn an average of $291,000
annually. In a group practice environment, it is also common for most practices to offer some type of
bonus or productivity incentive to all providers.”).
164. See Tara F. Bishop, Matthew J. Press, Salomeh Keyhani & Harold Alan Pincus, Acceptance of
Insurance by Psychiatrists and the Implications for Access to Mental Health Care, 71 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
PSYCHIATRY 176, 179 (2014) (“[In a study], [p]sychiatrists in solo practice were less likely to accept all
types of insurance . . . .”).
165. Id. at 180 (“Solo practices often can function with much less infrastructure than larger
single-specialty or multispecialty group practices. As a result, they may have little incentive to hire staff
to interact with insurance companies.”). Most psychiatrists already spend ten hours or more per week
doing administrative work and thirty-three hours seeing patients, so psychiatrists may simply find it
impracticable to jump through more hoops to receive insurance reimbursements. Leslie Kane, Medscape
Psychiatrist
Compensation
Report
2019,
MEDSCAPE
(Apr.
24,
2019),
https://www.medscape.com/slideshow/2019-compensation-psychiatrist-6011346#4
[https://perma.cc/5TCX-CAWC] (indicating that male psychiatrists spend an average of thirty-four hours
per week seeing patients, as compared to thirty-two hours per week among female psychiatrists); id.
(indicating that 40% of psychiatrists spend between ten and nineteen hours doing administrative work per
week, and 37% spend twenty hours or more on the same tasks).
166. Bishop et al., supra note 164, at 180 (“Primary care physicians probably can see and provide
management to patients in shorter visits . . . than psychiatrists, especially if psychiatrists want to provide
psychotherapy along with medication management. As a result, psychiatrists may not be able to see as
many patients in a day as physicians in other specialties.”).
167. Id. (“A shortage of psychiatrists may also be a potential reason why many do not accept
insurance. . . . [D]eclines [in the number of graduates from psychiatry training programs] coupled with an
aging workforce (55% of psychiatrists are aged 55 or older) may mean that the supply of psychiatrists
cannot meet the demand for their care.”).
168. VOLK ET AL., supra note 142, at 16.
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Reimbursement rates probably comprise the most burdensome of
those contracting terms. 169 Participating providers receive
reimbursement at much lower rates than their primary care and
specialist counterparts. 170 Insurers reimburse in-network behavioral
health care providers at lower rates relative even to Medicare-allowed
amounts, which provide an industry-recognized benchmark that most
primary care doctors’ and specialists’ rates exceed.171
Notably, reimbursement rate disparities persist despite falling under
the purview of the MHPAEA regulation of nonquantitative treatment
limitations (NQTLs).172 MHPAEA regulations, in adherence to the
MHPAEA’s core principle, require that reimbursement rates for
behavioral health care providers must be comparable to reimbursement
rates for other types of providers. 173 Although reimbursement
disparities are not themselves parity violations, they constitute “red
flags” that may indicate a parity violation in need of enforcement
oversight.174 In addition to enforcement-related factors, the failure of
legislative efforts to normalize reimbursement rates, to date, can also
be attributed to varying practices and views among payers and
providers.175
To begin with, some payers cite an inability to rely on the same
methodologies they use to determine reimbursement rates for medical
and surgical services when deciding rates for behavioral health care
services—differing
procedures
likely
influence
differing

169. Id. (“According to provider and patient representatives, low reimbursement rates, onerous health
plan processes for authorizing payment, and burdensome contracting terms are the dominant reasons for
the shortage of in-network mental health providers . . . .”).
170. MELEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 2, 5 fig.5, 30–44 app.J, 51–52 supp.tbl.4; GOODELL, supra note
13, at 5; Zhu et al., supra note 17.
171. See MELEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 5 fig.5.
172. 45 C.F.R § 146.136(c)(4)(ii)(D) (2018); VOLK ET AL., supra note 142, at 7.
173. VOLK ET AL., supra note 142, at 7.
174. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FAQS ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE
DISORDER PARITY IMPLEMENTATION AND THE 21ST CENTURY CURES ACT PART 39, at 10 (2019),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-FAQs/Downloads/FAQs-Part-39.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LYM2-62C2] (noting that “greatly disparate results . . . are a red flag that a plan or issuer
may be imposing an impermissible NQTL”); VOLK ET AL., supra note 142, at 17, 18.
175. VOLK ET AL., supra note 142, at 13 (describing deviating views among providers and payers
regarding minimum stays for mental health and SUD treatment).
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reimbursement levels.176 Further, providers and payers may hold
differing views on how long inpatient behavioral health stays should
reasonably last without prior authorization, making compromises on
reimbursement terms more elusive.177 Additionally, and somewhat
nonsensically, the billing methods that insurance companies use to
reimburse behavioral health care services can result in lower payments
to psychiatrists than to other types of medical doctors who render these
services.178 These diverging practices and views predictably contribute
to diverging reimbursement rates. 179
On the enforcement side, disparate reimbursement rates should
prompt a review of insurers’ reimbursement methodologies, but
confusion seems to exist among some state and local regulators about
whether they possess the authority to do so.180 Even where regulators
feel secure in their authority, the industry seems unaware of how to
actually conduct these reviews; reimbursement compliance can be
difficult to assess, particularly in states that do not generally reimburse
on a fee-for-service basis.181 Thus, following the theme of qualitative
and quantitative network adequacy standards, efforts to ensure

176. See id. (“One payer stated that for medical/surgical services, hospitals usually rely on
diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) to establish in-patient reimbursement rates based on long-standing
calculations, but because DRGs do not exist for [mental health and SUD] benefits, payers are more reliant
on utilization management to determine payment.”).
177. Id. (“One provider noted that it would be reasonable . . . to allow for a seven-day hospital stay for
mental health conditions without prior authorization; however, others expressed the opposite view. A
payer said standardizing care by imposing minimum stays would remove the incentive to provide
individualized care . . . .”).
178. Nicole M. Benson & Zirui Song, Prices and Cost Sharing for Psychotherapy in Network Versus
out of Network in the United States, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 1210, 1215 (2020) (“[I]nsurance reimbursement to
behavioral health providers for behavioral health services, largely billed using evaluation and management
codes[,] . . . can be less favorable than for peer specialties. For example, in 2014 the median in-network
reimbursement for a midlevel office visit . . . for a commercially insured patient was $76 for a
nonpsychiatrist medical doctor compared with $66 for a psychiatrist.”).
179. See MELEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 2, 5 fig.5.
180. VOLK ET AL., supra note 142, at 18 (“Regulators at [the California Department of Managed Health
Care] . . . indicated that they do not have the authority to review provider reimbursement rates. Their
authority to enforce MHPAEA, however, may provide inherent authority to review provider
reimbursement rates for NQTL compliance.”).
181. TARA ADAMS RAGONE & JOHN V. JACOBI, BRIEFING REPORT: THE PUZZLE OF PARITY:
IMPLEMENTING BEHAVIORAL HEALTH PARITY 11 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2917400
[https://perma.cc/BZ2M-9D3J] (“None of the well more than 100 people attending the [Sentinel Project’s
September 16, 2016, conference examining market responses to the ACA’s expansion and redefinition of
coverage] was able to suggest how the NQTL test applies to these varying reimbursement structures.”).
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reimbursement parity seem hampered by inadequate oversight and
enforcement. Without strong financial or regulatory incentives, low
network participation will continue. 182 Moreover, regulators remain
frustrated in their attempts to conduct reimbursement compliance
reviews due to other weak or nonexistent regulations that govern the
accuracy of insurance networks’ provider directories.183
5. Inaccurate Provider Directories
At first glance, the causal relationship between inaccurate
directories and inadequate networks might not seem readily
apparent.184 The two may often coexist within a given plan, but an
inaccurate directory negates even the expansive patient-choice
benefits of broad networks.185 Closer examination of enforcement
methods, however, reveals a surprising causal relationship: inaccurate
directories perpetuate network inadequacy. 186 Regulators often depend
on provider directories to conduct reviews of a plan’s compliance with
network adequacy regulations, so discrepancies can cause oversight of
inadequacies.187
The results of erroneous directories, however, reach more than just
regulators; these errors affect behavioral health patients and other
patients alike.188 One study revealed one PPO’s directory as having
182. See id.
183. See Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 975, 978. “[R]egulators . . . may rely on directory
information to determine whether a plan has an adequate network.” Id. at 975.
184. See id. “[The authors of a survey assessing directory inaccuracies] considered whether patients
who encountered [directory] inaccuracies filed a complaint about the mental health network.” Id. at 976
(emphasis added). “Associations between directory inaccuracy and use of out-of-network care may also
be indicative of mental health network inadequacy . . . .” Id. at 981 (emphasis added).
185. See Anderman, supra note 50 (“[P]lans with broad networks are likely to have upwards of 70[%]
of local providers participating.”).
186. Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 981 (“To assess whether insurers have provided patients with
sufficient in-network providers, states rely on a variety of network adequacy measures. . . . In turn, many
of these measures rely on directory data.”).
187. Id.
188. Compare id. at 978 (“Fifty-three percent of participants who had used a mental health directory
reported encountering at least one of the four directory problems in the past twelve months.”), with
Michael Adelberg, Austin Frakt, Daniel Polsky & Michelle Kitchman Strollo, Improving Provider
Directory Accuracy: Can Machine-Readable Directories Help?, 25 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 241, 241
(2019) (“A recent report from [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)] found that 52%
of providers in [Medicare Advantage (MA)] provider directories included at least [one] inaccuracy.”).
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inaccurate phone numbers for nearly one out of five psychiatrists. 189
Overall, 22% of the calls made in the study were to wrong numbers.190
In another study, over half of mental health patient-participants
reported encountering one of the four directory inaccuracies that
comprised the survey’s focus.191 The study found a significant
association between incorrect directories and out-of-network
utilization, which may indicate network inadequacy. 192
Although federal law requires Medicaid-managed care, Medicare
Advantage, and Marketplace plans to regularly update their
directories, no comparable federal protections apply to the commercial
insurance held by the majority of Americans. 193 Fewer than half of the
states require private plans to provide up-to-date directories.194
Recently, insurers have taken innovative steps to help increase their
compliance with directory regulations. 195 But the steps necessary for
compliance are divergent: in accordance with the common theme
among state-level network adequacy regulations, state requirements
vary on a number of fronts.196

189. Malowney et al., supra note 68, at 94–95 (“[Sixteen percent] of the numbers in the BCBS database
were wrong; they included numbers for a McDonald’s restaurant, a boutique, and a jewelry store.”).
190. Id. at 95 tbl.1.
191. Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 978.
192. Id. “Experiencing inaccuracies with the directory was significantly associated with use of
out-of-network providers. . . . Among participants who encountered any of the four kinds of directory
inaccuracies studied, 40[%] were treated by an out-of-network provider in the past year, compared with
20[%] among those who did not encounter directory inaccuracies.” Id. (citation omitted). “Associations
between directory inaccuracy and use of out-of-network care may also be indicative of mental health
network inadequacy, which is a problem [because] psychiatrists are less likely than other physicians to
participate in private insurer networks.” Id. at 981.
193. Id. at 981.
194. Id.
195. Susan Morse, UnitedHealthcare, Optum, Humana, MultiPlan and Quest Diagnostics Launch
Blockchain
Provider
Director
Pilot,
HEALTHCARE
FIN.
(Apr.
2,
2018),
https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/unitedhealthcare-optum-humana-multiplan-and-questdiagnostics-launch-blockchain-provider [https://perma.cc/4VKE-AD23] (describing insurers’ efforts to
use blockchain technology to reduce the “$2.1 billion . . . spent annually across the healthcare system
chasing and maintaining provider data”).
196. Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 981 (“Approximately twenty states have requirements directly
related to directory accuracy for private plans, though these state laws vary in how often the directories
must be updated, the types of plans covered (for example, health maintenance organizations and preferred
provider organizations), and the content required.”).
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Moreover, mistaken out-of-network utilization resulting from
directory inaccuracies has previously led to surprise medical bills.197
Some states paved the way for the recent federal ban on surprise billing
by passing bans of their own.198 Opponents of these bans have argued
that the laws diminish networks and “adversely [affect] patients’
access to in-network care.”199 These claims appear unsubstantiated,
however, and at least one state saw a decrease in out-of-network
utilization for affected specialties after it passed a no surprise billing
law.200 Nonetheless, another problem inhibits legislators’ efforts to
ensure behavioral health care providers’ adequate representation in
insurance networks: not enough exist. 201
B. Provider Shortages
Shortages of mental health care providers are rampant throughout
every state and territory in the United States. 202 Over one third of the
197. Loren Adler, Erin Duffy, Bich Ly & Erin Trish, California Saw Reduction in Out-of-Network Care
from Affected Specialties After 2017 Surprise Billing Law, BROOKINGS (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2019/09/26/california-sawreduction-in-out-of-network-care-from-affected-specialties-after-2017-surprise-billing-law/
[https://perma.cc/EAW5-JYEN] (“Surprise out-of-network bills can occur when patients are unexpectedly
treated by an out-of-network provider . . . .”).
198. Pollitz et al., supra note 80; Kliff & Sanger-Katz, supra note 79. See generally NYS HEALTH
FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF: NEW YORK’S EFFORTS TO REFORM SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLING (2019),
https://nyshealthfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/new-yorks-efforts-to-reform-surprisemedical-billing.pdf [https://perma.cc/NUW2-CH4W] (discussing New York’s 2015 surprise billing law).
199. Adler et al., supra note 197. Opponents of California’s surprise billing law claimed that the law
reduced provider participation in insurance networks:
[The] void [in data created by the novelty of surprise billing laws] leaves a lot of
room for unsubstantiated claims by stakeholders. The California Medical
Association (CMA) published a public letter in July [2019] urging federal
lawmakers to avoid California’s payment standard approach, asserting that it had
diminished networks and reduced access to specialty care in California. . . .
....
. . . [The CMA asserts that] “[u]nder California’s surprise billing law[,] . . . patient
complaints about access to care have increased by almost 50%.”
Id.
200. Id. (“[T]he CMA does not cite empirical research supporting any of [its] assertions [that
California’s surprise billing law has diminished networks]. . . . [The authors] observ[ed] a 17% decline in
the share of services delivered out-of-network . . . .”).
201. See infra Part II.B.
202. See Mental Health Professional Shortage Areas Table, supra note 64; see also Mental Health Care
Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs), KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-
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United States’ population lives in a Health Professional Shortage Area
(HPSA) for mental health care providers.203 HPSA designations,
which fall under the purview of the Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA), indicate a population-to-provider ratio of at
least thirty thousand to one for mental health services.204
Of the psychiatrists in the United States, an estimated one in five
does not accept new patients. 205 Estimates for Marketplace plans in
certain parts of the country have put the percentage far lower.206 These
assessments, along with long appointment wait times, suggest that the
available supply of behavioral health care providers finds itself
stretched thin.207
Although markers of an inadequate supply of behavioral health care
providers may be found throughout the country, rural areas tend to feel
the effects of behavioral health shortfalls most acutely. 208 Rural
shortages are especially troublesome because people living in rural
areas are as likely—or even more likely—to suffer from mental health
conditions and SUDs than individuals in urban areas.209 Poor internet
indicator/mental-health-care-health-professional-shortage-areashpsas/?activeTab=map&currentTimeframe=0&selectedDistributions=total-mental-health-care-hpsadesignations&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
[https://perma.cc/7P6U-GH6M].
203. Compare Mental Health Professional Shortage Areas Table, supra note 64 (cataloging the number
of Americans that live in a Health Provider Shortage Area (HSPA) for mental health, which equaled
129,640,558 as of September 30, 2021), with U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/VTV4-74C9] (Oct. 19, 2022, 6:57 PM) (displaying
the total population of the United States, which was an estimated 332,856,150 on October 19, 2021).
204. Mental Health Professional Shortage Areas Table, supra note 64. As of September 30, 2021, the
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) had approved 5,930 mental health HPSA
designations, and a total of 6,599 providers were needed to fill the population-to-provider gap. Id.
205. Kalter, supra note 6; see also Malowney et al., supra note 68, at 95 tbl.1 (indicating that 21% of
the psychiatrists called as part of a study were not accepting new patients).
206. HONBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 3 (“[I]n January[] 2015, the Mental Health Association of
Maryland published a study which revealed that only 14% of the psychiatrists listed in QHPs in the
Maryland exchange were actually accepting new patients and available for an appointment within 45
days.”).
207. See, e.g., Kalter, supra note 6 (“Swamped psychiatry practices may have long waits for
appointments or may even turn away new patients. According to one study[,] . . . [a]bout one in five
psychiatrists were not accepting new patients.”).
208. Blake, supra note 57, at 135–36; see also, e.g., Malowney et al., supra note 68 (finding an average
wait time of twenty-five days for a first psychiatrist appointment in three large cities: Houston, Chicago,
and Boston). See generally CHIEDI, supra note 71 (detailing provider shortages in New Mexico).
209. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., HHS PUB. NO. (SMA) 16-4989, RURAL
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infrastructure compounds the effects of shortages on rural residents’
ability to locate providers, and unequal distributions of behavioral
health care providers throughout rural states contribute to the long
distances that these residents must often traverse in search of care.210
To address the behavioral health workforce shortage and mitigate its
effects, federal and state governments use financial incentive programs
to boost recruitment and telehealth services to bridge geographic
divides.211
1. Scholarships and Loan Repayment Programs for Medical
Students
Currently, the federal government offers student loan forgiveness
and loan repayment programs (LRPs) via the military and a wide array
of federal agencies. 212 LRPs and scholarships provide strong
incentives for students to enroll in medical school. 213 These programs
repay some or all medical school loans in exchange for any one of a
variety of post-graduation commitments, which include engaging in
research or public service, serving in the military, or agreeing to
practice in an HPSA for a fixed period. 214 In addition to federal
programs, states administer their own similar LRPs, and the American
Psychological Association (APA) provides a search engine on their
website for “more than 600 scholarships, grants, and awards sponsored

BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH:
TELEHEALTH
CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 1
(2016),
https://store.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/d7/priv/sma16-4989.pdf [https://perma.cc/VVF8-2WW8].
210. See id. at 2; see also, e.g., CHIEDI, supra note 71, at 8 (depicting New Mexico’s uneven distribution
of behavioral health care providers geographically). “[New Mexico’s] 2,665 licensed behavioral health
providers are distributed unevenly across the State.” Id. at 7.
211. See infra Part II.B.
212. Ken Budd, 7 Ways to Reduce Medical School Debt, ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS. (Oct. 14, 2020),
https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/7-ways-reduce-medical-school-debt
[https://perma.cc/H3T9E38C]; NHSC Loan Repayment Program, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., NAT’L HEALTH SERV. CORPS,
https://nhsc.hrsa.gov/loan-repayment/nhsc-loan-repayment-program.html [https://perma.cc/7U82-R848]
(Feb. 2022).
213. See, e.g., Building Healthier Communities, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., NAT’L HEALTH SERV.
CORPS,
https://nhsc.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/nhsc/about-us/nhsc-builds-healthy-communities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2W5P-N2FC] (describing strengthening medical workforces because of National Health
Service Corps (NHSC) programs).
214. Id.; Supporting Scientific Discovery, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, DIV. OF LOAN REPAYMENT,
https://www.lrp.nih.gov [https://perma.cc/9DGX-RKYF].
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by the APA and other psychology-related organizations.”215 For at
least some of these awards and programs, however, federal dollars
seem to provide the primary source of funding. 216
One of these federal programs, Public Service Loan Forgiveness
(PSLF), requires students to work for ten years at an eligible
organization and make 120 payments toward their student loans before
forgiving their remaining balance. 217 Although the federal government
intended the program to encourage students to enter fields such as
teaching and firefighting, physicians have increasingly entered
medical school intending to enroll in PSLF. 218 The program does little,
however, to target workforce shortages in specific disciplines or
geographical areas: most doctors qualify through working at nonprofit
hospitals, which comprise roughly three quarters of the nation’s
hospitals.219
In recent years, politicians have proposed maximum forgiveness
limits on the PSLF program or eliminating it entirely.220 One
215. Grants, Awards and Funding, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/about/awards
[https://perma.cc/AU2T-FDLL].
216. See, e.g., About the Predoctoral Fellowship in Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, AM.
PSYCH. ASS’N (2011), https://www.apa.org/about/awards/predoctoral-mhsas [https://perma.cc/C3GJJAP4]; see also Budd, supra note 212.
217. Melanie Lockert, NHSC Repayment Program — How to Know if it Makes Sense for You, STUDENT
LOAN PLANNER, https://www.studentloanplanner.com/nhsc-loan-repayment/ [https://perma.cc/M3NE4W64] (Nov. 29, 2021).
218. Ari B. Friedman, Justin A. Grischkan, E. Ray Dorsey & Benjamin P. George, Forgiven but Not
Relieved: US Physician Workforce Consequences of Changes to Public Service Loan Forgiveness, 31 J.
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1237, 1238 (2016) (“While [Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF)] was not
originally aimed at physicians, intended participation among medical graduates has grown 21.2% per year
since 2010.”); Anna Helhoski & Colin Beresford, Public Service Loan Forgiveness: What It Is, How It
Works, NERDWALLET, https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/loans/student-loans/public-service-loanforgiveness [https://perma.cc/NQJ7-VCQP] (Jan. 27, 2022). “After significant growth in PSLF over the
past 5 years, nearly one-third of medical graduates with loan obligations are now reporting their intent to
receive PSLF forgiveness funds, and enrollment in the program continues to grow.” Friedman et al., supra,
at 1240.
219. Friedman et al., supra note 218, at 1237.
220. Id. at 1238 (“In response to concerns that PSLF will heavily subsidize lawyers, doctors, and other
professionals, the President’s 2017 budget proposes limiting maximum loan forgiveness to $57,500.”);
Adam S. Minsky, Trump Proposes Repealing Public Service Loan Forgiveness — Can He Do That?,
FORBES (Feb. 11, 2020, 9:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamminsky/2020/02/11/trumpproposes-repealing-public-service-loan-forgiveness—can-he-do-that/?sh=4c4abaa2bdbb
[https://perma.cc/A3AG-86SS] (“[Former] President Trump has proposed slashing student loan-related
spending at the [Department] of Education by $5.6 billion. Included in the proposed cuts is a repeal of the
popular (but poorly administered) Public Service Loan Forgiveness program.”).
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explanation for this hostility comes from the origins of the program:
politicians originally designed PSLF with low-paying, high-demand
career choices in mind. 221 Although the medical profession certainly
satisfies the latter criterion, it does not so much satisfy the former;
physicians’ salaries in all disciplines typically reach six figures.222
Additionally, the National Health Service Corps (NHSC), another
federal program, provides scholarships and LRPs in exchange for
practitioners’ agreements to serve in HPSAs.223 Conducted by HRSA,
these programs provide financial assistance to medical students in a
range of eligible disciplines, including mental health and SUD
specialists.224 NHSC programs appear quite competitive.225
Their selectivity notwithstanding, NHSC programs have apparently
seen success in increasing the supply of behavioral health care
providers.226 Unlike PSLF, these programs specifically target
behavioral health.227 Further, these and other programs administered
by HRSA, such as the Title VII Behavioral Health Workforce
Education and Training Program (BHWET) for professionals, have
recently seen considerable funding increases. 228
221. Helhoski & Beresford, supra note 218.
222. Physician Starting Salaries by Specialty: 2019 vs. 2018, MERRITT HAWKINS (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://www.merritthawkins.com/news-and-insights/blog/healthcare-news-and-trends/physician-startingsalaries-by-specialty-2019-vs-2018/ [https://perma.cc/5P76-TPAD] (comparing average salary offers for
twenty specialties in 2019, which reach into the six figures for every specialty, including nurse
practitioners and Certified Registered Nurse Anesthesiologists (CRNAs)).
223. NHSC Loan Repayment Program, supra note 212.
224. See id.; see also, e.g., NHSC Substance Use Disorder Workforce Loan Repayment Program,
HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., NAT’L HEALTH SERV. CORPS, https://nhsc.hrsa.gov/loanrepayment/nhsc-sud-workforce-loan-repayment-program.html [https://perma.cc/75L6-JQLP] (Feb.
2022).
225. HRSAtube, Factors for Determining an NHSC Award, YOUTUBE, at 01:07–01:18 (Dec. 9, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dc4IAHq0d-g&feature=emb_title (“Each year, [National Health
Service Corps (NHSC)] programs receive many eligible applications, so it is a competitive award
process.”); see also Budd, supra note 212 (“Witt was turned down for an NHSC scholarship . . . .”).
226. See Building Healthier Communities, supra note 213. According to NHSC data, its scholarships
and loan repayment programs (LRPs) have doubled the number of SUD clinicians nationwide and the
“[m]ental and behavioral health total field strength [has] increased by more than 40%.” Id. Of the more
than 16,000 providers participating in the NHSC programs in 2020, more than 2,500 are mental and
behavioral health clinicians practicing in rural areas. Id.
227. See id.; see also, e.g., NHSC Substance Use Disorder Workforce Loan Repayment Program, supra
note 224.
228. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 2021: JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR
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Fortunately, policy analysts expect that current efforts will lessen
the projected shortage of behavioral health care providers.229 Despite
the quantifiable success of NHSC programs to date and the recent
expansion of federal funding—the effects of which have yet to be fully
realized—HRSA still currently designates the vast majority of the land
area in the United States and its territories as HPSAs for mental health,
which indicates a gap still in need of closing. 230
2. The Use of Telehealth Services and Integrated Care Models
Telehealth, a broad term that encompasses the narrower
“telemedicine,” constitutes an important tool in the toolkit for
combatting the shortfall of health care providers. 231 Telehealth uses
internet and cellular communications technologies, both in real time
and asynchronously, to remotely deliver “health information and
treatments” to both patients and providers. 232 In other words, although
telemedicine encompasses only services to patients, telehealth also

APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEES
130
(2020),
https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/about/budget/budget-justification-fy2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EN37-WC24] (indicating an increase from $111,916,000 for Behavioral Health
Workforce Development Programs for HRSA’s final fiscal year 2019 budget to $138,916,000 for the
enacted fiscal year 2020 budget and an $8 million increase for the Behavioral Health Workforce Education
and Training (BHWET) Program in fiscal year 2018); HHS Awards $319 Million to Support Health
Workforce Providers Caring for the Underserved, NEWSWIRES (Oct. 23, 2019, 5:22 PM),
https://www.einnews.com/pr_news/500117604/hhs-awards-319-million-to-support-health-workforceproviders-caring-for-the-underserved [https://perma.cc/G4TM-DPMS] (“This year’s awards significantly
expand the NHSC’s efforts to combat the opioid epidemic in areas of greatest need.”).
229. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 228, at 129 (“[B]y 2025, HRSA’s BHWET program
is projected to eliminate over 40% of the projected shortfall of behavioral health providers, and provide
thousands of new paraprofessionals to enhance the nation’s health workforce capacity in critical areas of
need.”).
230. See Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) - Mental Health, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
https://data.hrsa.gov/ExportedMaps/MapGallery/HPSAMH.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LFK-KLVA]
(depicting widespread HPSAs for mental health) (Feb. 21, 2022).
231. What is Telehealth? How Is It Different from Telemedicine?, HEALTHIT.GOV,
https://www.healthit.gov/faq/what-telehealth-how-telehealth-different-telemedicine
[https://perma.cc/3E8C-SEBZ] (Oct. 17, 2019) (“Telehealth is different from telemedicine because it
refers to a broader scope of remote healthcare services than telemedicine. While telemedicine refers
specifically to remote clinical services, telehealth can refer to remote non-clinical services, such as
provider training, administrative meetings, and continuing medical education, in addition to clinical
services.”).
232. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 209.
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encompasses training for health care professionals and the exchange
of ideas among them.233
The health care industry has employed behavioral telehealth
services to perhaps its greatest effect in behavioral care integration and
collaborative care models.234 Despite some differences, these
frameworks rest on the same premise: integrating behavioral health
specialists’ insight into patients’ routine primary care can alleviate the
effects of the behavioral workforce shortage and supply cost-effective
behavioral care to more people. 235 By using telehealth to connect with
primary care doctors, psychiatrists can oversee treatment for many
more patients per day. 236 Due to more frequent contact with patients,
primary care physicians often find themselves in a better position for
early detection of behavioral health conditions. 237 Evidence shows that
early treatment of mental health conditions can save enormous health

233. What is Telehealth? How Is It Different from Telemedicine?, supra note 231.
234. See JÜRGEN UNÜTZER, HENRY HARBIN, MICHAEL SCHOENBAUM & BENJAMIN DRUSS, CTR. FOR
HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, THE COLLABORATIVE CARE MODEL: AN APPROACH FOR INTEGRATING
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN MEDICAID HEALTH HOMES 1 (2013),
https://www.chcs.org/media/HH_IRC_Collaborative_Care_Model__052113_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66E5-Q26U] (“More than [seventy] randomized controlled trials have shown
collaborative care for common mental disorders such as depression to be more effective and cost-effective
than usual care, across diverse practice settings and patient populations.”).
235. Brittany H. Eghaneyan, Katherine Sanchez & Diane B. Mitschke, Implementation of a
Collaborative Care Model for the Treatment of Depression and Anxiety in a Community Health Center:
Results from a Qualitative Case Study, 7 J. MULTIDISCIPLINARY HEALTHCARE 503, 503 (2014) (“The
collaborative care model is a systematic approach to the treatment of depression and anxiety in primary
care settings that involves the integration of care managers and consultant psychiatrists, with primary care
physician oversight, to more proactively manage mental disorders as chronic diseases, rather than treating
acute symptoms.”).
236. Id. at 508 (“The collaborative care team members used various forms of communication with each
other. Emails, messaging via the EHR system, telephone calls, and in-person meetings were all ways in
which communication about patients within the program was conducted.”); ERIK R. VANDERLIP, JAMES
RUNDELL, MARC AVERY, CAROL ALTER, CHARLES ENGEL, JOHN FORTNEY, DAVID LIU & MARK
WILLIAMS, DISSEMINATION OF INTEGRATED CARE WITHIN ADULT PRIMARY CARE SETTINGS: THE
COLLABORATIVE CARE MODEL 10 (2016) (“For models integrating mental health into primary care,
mental health providers can impact the care of more patients than in the specialty mental health referral
sector. Integrated mental health providers take on more consultative and team-based roles and focus on
helping primary care providers (PCPs) treat mental health disorders, leveraging their skills and expertise
to reach more patients in need.”).
237. American Psychiatric Association, The Collaborative Care Model, YOUTUBE, at 0:21–0:29 (Apr.
25, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXZTgq3GyPw (“Many patients with mental health and
substance use concerns talk to their primary care providers, or PCP, first.”).
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care costs in the long run and that integrated care models effectively
address these conditions. 238
Further, the nature of many behavioral health care services makes
them particularly amenable to direct delivery via telemedicine. 239 For
example, psychiatrists conduct psychiatric interviews, which comprise
a fundamental part of diagnostic procedures, to identify behavioral
conditions and prescribe treatment, and the conversational nature of a
patient interview renders it particularly well suited for video
conferencing.240 Although improvements in imaging technology, lab
tests, and the understanding of the link between mental health
conditions and physical ailments have increased the use of physical
exams and tests about diagnoses of mental health conditions,
psychiatric interviews remain a key component of the process.241
By virtue of telehealth’s ability to bridge geographical divides, rural
areas stand to benefit significantly from its use.242 Telemedicine allows
rural patients to seek behavioral treatment confidentially, ameliorating
privacy concerns specific to rural communities. 243 Further, integrated
238. See generally UNÜTZER ET AL., supra note 234. See generally Paul Gionfriddo, Theresa Nguyen
& Nathaniel Counts, Reducing Health Care Costs Through Early Intervention on Mental Illnesses,
HEALTH
AFFS.
BLOG
(Jan.
25,
2016),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160125.052822/full/ [https://perma.cc/BBX8-RWDD]
(describing how early interventions for mental illnesses can save money and produce better patient
outcomes).
239. See, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 209, at 5 (“The U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs piloted a substance use treatment program using an in-home messaging
device (IHMD), a hand-held device that connected to a telephone outlet. . . . Clients used the IHMD every
day to access a combined behavioral intervention (CBI) for [SUDs]. CBI is a blend of
cognitive-behavioral therapy, [twelve]-Step approaches, and motivational interviewing.”).
240. See Daniel Lin, Jason Martens, Agnieszka Majdan & Jonathan Fleming, Initial Psychiatric
Assessment: A Practical Guide to the Clinical Interview, 45 B.C. MED. J. 172, 172 (2003),
https://bcmj.org/articles/initial-psychiatric-assessment-practical-guide-clinical-interview#2
[https://perma.cc/5UC5-E4WR] (“It is widely accepted that clinical interviewing is the fundamental
diagnostic tool in psychiatry. . . . Unlike other areas of medicine, psychiatry lacks external validating
criteria, such as lab tests or imaging, to help confirm or exclude diagnoses.” (citations omitted)).
241. See
Mental
and
Behavioral
Health
Assessment
Tools,
ICANOTES,
https://www.icanotes.com/2019/10/27/understanding-the-different-types-of-mental-health-assessmentsand-screening-tools-for-behavioral-health-clinicians/
[https://perma.cc/4PVC-XUNH]
(listing
“interview[s]” first among the instrumentalities of behavioral health assessments).
242. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 209, at 4 (“The single
area where improved [rural] patient care could be realized is in the significant expansion and active use
of telehealth.”).
243. Id. at 3. Telehealth addresses privacy concerns that crop up in rural communities in several ways:
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care models have the capacity to connect behavioral health specialists
from anywhere in the country to rural nonspecialists for both training
and case consultation. 244
Poorly developed communications infrastructures in many rural
communities, however, currently limit the potential of telehealth to fill
the behavioral gaps in those areas. 245 In recent years, the federal
government has spent billions of dollars on improving rural internet
infrastructure as part of programs like the Connect America Fund. 246
Some have criticized these investments as inefficient, however, and
current progress seems limited. 247 In 2015, nearly one quarter of rural
households lacked basic broadband service entirely, and 39% lacked
access to advanced broadband.248 Limited bandwidth means limited
availability of telehealth services. 249
In addition to receiving-end connection issues, providers of
behavioral telehealth face their own challenges. 250 First, telehealth

Individuals living in rural locations commonly identify a lack of privacy as a barrier
to receiving treatment. Associated with the lack of privacy is the desire to avoid
being the subject of gossip or being marginalized. In small communities, residents
may recognize whose car is in the therapist’s parking lot, for instance. . . .
....
. . . [Rural] [p]articipants [in focus groups] said that private information spreads
easily through rumors in their small community, increasing the likelihood that
individuals experiencing depression would be judged by others they see regularly.
Fear of being labeled “crazy” prevented people with depression from seeking
care. . . .
....
. . . One of the most promising contributions of telehealth is its potential to provide
confidential therapies, enabling individuals living in rural locations to access
treatment and services without inadvertent disclosure to their communities.
Id. at 2–3.
244. Id. at 2 (“Technology can facilitate the delivery of behavioral health services to people in rural
areas . . . by connecting nonspecialists in rural areas—commonly primary care practitioners—to networks
of behavioral health specialists throughout the country for case consultation.”).
245. Id. at 5 (“Internet access remains a challenge to rural telehealth.”).
246. Id.; 47 C.F.R. § 54 (2020).
247. Scott Wallsten, Rural Broadband Subsidies: The Gift that Keeps on Giving, T ECH. POL’Y INST.
(Jan. 22, 2018), https://techpolicyinstitute.org/2018/01/22/rural-broadband-subsidies-the-gift-that-keepson-giving/ [https://perma.cc/4MJT-TTJ5] (“[Federal rural broadband subsidies are not working], and we
should fix the problems instead of making them bigger. . . . [O]verhead costs take up about 60[%] of
subsidies sent to rural providers, displacing potentially productive investment.”).
248. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 209, at 5.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 6.
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programs can be initially expensive to implement. 251 In addition to
high startup costs, ensuring patient security and privacy requires data
encryption and network firewalls, which in turn require technical
support.252 Any technical problems that do arise can lead to disruptions
in treatment.253 Further, providers must educate themselves on a state’s
licensing laws before delivering telehealth services to patients in that
state, and variations in these laws can make the process confusing,
costly, and time-consuming for providers.254
Unfortunately, state licensing laws do not comprise the only source
of headache-inducing variability for providers of behavioral
telemedicine.255 States across the country have increasingly enacted
telehealth commercial payer statutes in recent years, which aim to
expand access to telehealth services by making them more affordable
for patients and providers alike. 256 Much like the disparities seen in
state-level mental health parity laws, however, the strength and
efficacy of these laws vary widely from state to state. 257 Although
many of the statutes mandate coverage for telehealth services, some
do not, which negatively impacts consumers. 258 Some of these laws
seek to expand access to telehealth by requiring some form of
reimbursement parity between in-person and remote delivery of the

251. Id. at 7.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 6.
254. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 209, at 6.
255. See NATHANIEL M. LACKTMAN, JACQUELINE N. ACOSTA, SARAH J. IACOMINI & SUNNY J.
LEVINE, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, 50-STATE SURVEY OF TELEHEALTH COMMERCIAL INSURANCE LAWS 4
(2021), https://www.foley.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2021/02/21mc30431-50state-telemedreportmaster-02082021.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW8B-JMT8].
256. Joel Berg, Report Finds Only 10 States Provide True Telehealth Payment Parity, MEDCITY NEWS
(Dec. 5, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://medcitynews.com/2019/12/report-finds-only-10-states-provide-truetelehealth-payment-parity/?rf=1 [https://perma.cc/Y3RZ-2B5R] (reporting in 2019 that forty-two states
and the District of Columbia had enacted laws covering commercial insurers and telehealth, up from fewer
than twenty-five about five years earlier). Although “2020 introduced a massive array of new changes to
state telehealth laws and rules in connection with the COVID-19 public health emergency[,] [m]any of
those changes are on a temporary basis, and states typically have kept their COVID-19 telehealth
emergency rules separate from their permanent telehealth coverage policies.” LACKTMAN ET AL., supra
note 255, at 2.
257. LACKTMAN ET AL., supra note 255, at 4.
258. See id. (“[Of the forty-three states that maintain a telehealth commercial payer statute,] three states
have telehealth coverage laws on the books that do not actually mandate health plans to cover services
delivered via telehealth (Florida, Illinois, and Michigan).”).
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same services.259 Only a few states mandate payment parity, however,
and even fewer offer “true ‘payment parity[,]’” which negatively
impacts providers.260 Although trends have been positive, roadblocks
to telehealth still remain.261
C. The Sum of Provider Shortages and Inadequate Network
Adequacy Regulations
In sum, the word “patchwork” more than aptly describes the supply
of behavioral health care providers and the state and federal network
adequacy regulations promulgated to date. 262 When viewing network
adequacy regulations and provider shortages alongside one another,
the holes in the patchwork become abundantly clear.263 Fortunately,
however, light shines through, and examination of these failures
illuminates opportunities for improvement.
III. PROPOSAL
To overcome access disparities in behavioral health care,
governments should follow a three-pronged approach. First, regulators
should bolster key insurance regulations, namely those governing
reimbursement rates and provider directories, and enforce existing
network adequacy regulations more strongly. 264 Second, Congress
should provide tax incentives for psychiatrists to accept insurance,
especially Medicaid.265 Third, loan repayment assistance, expanded
scopes of practice, educational programs, and telehealth services must

259. Id.
260. See id. (“Currently, [twenty-two] states maintain laws expressly addressing reimbursement of
telehealth services[,] . . . [but only fourteen] of [them] offer true ‘payment parity[,]’ . . . meaning that
providers outside those [fourteen] states may find they receive lower payment for telehealth-based
services compared to in-person services (i.e., same service code, but different reimbursement rates).”).
261. Id.
262. GOODELL, supra note 13, at 4.
263. See generally MELEK ET AL., supra note 12 (demonstrating high out-of-network utilization for
behavioral health care patients and disparate insurance reimbursements for behavioral health care
providers).
264. See infra Part III.A.
265. See infra Part III.B.
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bridge the gap between supply and demand for behavioral health care
providers.266
A. Strengthen and Enforce Network Adequacy Regulations for
Behavioral Health
To increase behavioral providers’ presence in insurance networks,
regulators should narrowly impose quantitative reimbursement
standards for behavioral health care services while capping allowable
out-of-network charges for those same services.267 Further, although
states should consider enacting stronger network adequacy standards
more widely, regulators should first bolster enforcement of network
adequacy standards by implementing review processes that focus on
patient outcomes.268
1. Establish Quantitative Reimbursement Requirements
Behavioral health care providers frequently cite low reimbursement
as a primary driver of their decisions not to participate in insurance
networks.269 To increase behavioral health specialists’ participation in
insurance networks, federal regulations should—accounting for
variation by plan type and geographical differences in health care
prices—establish quantitative reimbursement baselines for federally
regulated plans in two areas of behavioral health treatment: (1) the
treatment of severe mental illness (SMI), and (2) integrated care. For
state-regulated plans, the federal government should require states to
adopt their own quantitative reimbursement standards, and if they do
not, the federal baseline will serve as the fallback standard.
Additionally, lawmakers should raise reimbursement rates in these two
266. See infra Part III.C.
267. See infra Part III.A.1.
268. See infra Part III.A.2. Mark A. Hall and Paul B. Ginsburg have proposed a partially outcome-based
approach: “[A] thoroughgoing regulatory approach demands considerable administrative resources. In
attempting to reduce the complexities of regulating the structure of provider networks, we might instead
consider whether the regulatory focus should be on the ultimate outcome of network adequacy: achieving
actual access to care.” HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 20.
269. E.g., Benson & Song, supra note 178 (“[D]eclining in-network prices over time . . . may
discourage [mental health] providers from participating in insurance networks; for example, psychologists
have reported low reimbursement rates as a primary deterrent to participating in Medicare.”).
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areas for public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. In
accordance with industry benchmarks, these baselines should be
expressed as percentages of Medicare-allowed amounts.270
By tailoring reimbursement rate standards to these two areas, the
mandates will present less of a shock to the private insurance industry
than across-the-board behavioral reimbursement minimums otherwise
might. Although nearly one in five Americans suffer from mental
health conditions, only roughly one quarter of those Americans have
SMI.271 Among individuals who actually seek treatment, the
proportion is not much higher: slightly more than one third have
SMI.272 People with SMI typically require more expensive treatment,
but their lower numbers will help to limit the cost of reimbursement
minimums to insurers.273
Due to integrated care’s crucial role in the efficient delivery of
affordable behavioral health care, regulators should also apply
reimbursement minimums to integrated care models.274 Most people
who seek mental health care do not have SMI, so they typically require
more modest treatments that suit integrated care models. 275 The

270. MELEK ET AL., supra note 12, at 5 fig.5.
271. Mental Illness, supra note 10 (“In 2020, there were an estimated 52.9 million adults aged
[eighteen] or older in the United States with [any mental illness]. This number represented 21.0% of all
U.S. adults. . . . In 2020, . . . 14.2 million adults [had] SMI.”).
272. Id. (“In 2020, among the 52.9 million adults with [any mental illness], 24.3 million (46.2%)
received mental health services in the past year. . . . In 2020, among the 14.2 million adults with SMI, 9.1
million (64.5%) received mental health treatment in the past year.”)
273. Claire de Oliveira, Joyce Cheng, Simone Vigod, Jürgen Rehm & Paul Kurdyak, Patients with High
Mental Health Costs Incur over 30 Percent More Costs than Other High-Cost Patients, 35 HEALTH AFFS.
36, 40–41 (“In [a] study, which examined all Medicaid high-cost patients in Maryland, the authors found
that serious mental illness (affective psychoses and schizophrenia) and dependence on drugs, alcohol, or
both were among the most frequent diagnoses for all high-cost patients with hospitalizations.”); see also
Mental Illness, supra note 10.
274. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE COLLABORATIVE CARE MODEL FOR MENTAL HEALTH: IMPROVES
OUTCOMES,
REDUCES
COSTS,
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Advocacy/Medicaid-Payment-CollaborativeCare-Model/CCM-for-MH-One-Pager.pdf [https://perma.cc/N73W-NBPQ] (“Better care coordination
via integration of mental health and primary care has been shown to improve patient access and outcomes.
Three decades of research and over 80 randomized controlled trials (RCT) have identified one model in
particular—the Collaborative Care Model (CoCM)—as being effective and efficient in delivering
integrated care. It is estimated that $26 [–] $48 billion could be saved annually through effective
integration of mental health and other medical care.” (citations omitted)).
275. Mental Illness, supra note 10 (demonstrating that most people who seek treatment for mental
illness have relatively moderate illnesses).
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sustainability and success of these models hinge on ensuring adequate
reimbursement.276
Further, accounting for plan type and regional price differences will
allow the flexibility necessary to sustain the regime.277 Federally
established minimums, however, prevent states from effectively
skirting the problem with vague qualitative standards.278 Because
increasing the specificity of regulations will not cure patchwork
enforcement, states should establish reimbursement task forces with
unequivocal enforcement authority. 279
To ensure that reimbursement rate minimums produce the intended
effect—behavioral health care providers’ participation in insurance
networks—regulators should also cap providers’ and payers’
allowable out-of-network charges to insured patients for behavioral
health care, even if those patients knowingly receive care from an
out-of-network provider. These caps should complement tax
incentives that spur providers to participate in insurance networks and
accept Medicaid.280 If not addressed from all sides, the market
dynamics that make foregoing network participation more profitable
for providers will remain unchanged.281
With this multi-sided framework, reimbursement minimums should
increase behavioral health care providers’ participation in insurance
276. Making the Case: Medicaid Payment for the Collaborative Care Model, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
https://www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/professional-interests/integrated-care/getpaid/medicaid-payment-and-collaborative-care-model
[https://perma.cc/G4NK-93NJ] (“However,
successfully expanding use of the [collaborative care] model depends on appropriate reimbursement for
services related to care management and psychiatric consultation, and infrastructure support for staffing
changes and implementation of data tracking tools.”).
277. See JANE B. WISHNER & JEREMY MARKS, ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH NETWORK ADEQUACY
STANDARDS:
LESSONS
FROM
FOUR
STATES
11
(2017),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88946/2001184-ensuring-compliance-withnetwork-adequacy-standards-lessons-from-four-states_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UEK-M2H5] (“States
will continue to design their own standards . . . that meet the needs of their populations and address the
unique combination of factors (including demographic, geographic, financial, and market issues) affecting
both the health care provider and insurer markets.”).
278. See, e.g., Jacobi et al., supra note 65 (noting most states’ tendency to use “broad, subjective
standards” for regulating network adequacy).
279. See VOLK ET AL., supra note 142 (“[State regulators’] authority to enforce MHPAEA . . . may
provide inherent authority to review provider reimbursement rates for NQTL compliance.”).
280. See infra Part III.B.
281. See Pear, supra note 157 (“[M]any psychiatrists may have so much demand for their services that
they do not need to accept insurance.”).
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networks.282 Financial considerations seem to best explain
psychiatrists’ general reluctance to accept insurance, and low
reimbursement rates comprise a substantial part of those
considerations.283 Without regulatory intervention, the combination of
high demand for psychiatric services and ballooning provider
shortages will ensure that these harmful market dynamics remain
controlling for many years to come. 284
2. Strengthen Existing Network Adequacy Regulations and Their
Enforcement
To date, most states have scarcely enforced their network adequacy
standards, whether qualitative or quantitative. 285 Without enforcement,
regulators will have difficulty determining whether regulations can
provide sufficient protection as they currently exist.286 To avoid
needlessly overburdening insurers and increasing the cost of health
care, regulators should first focus on taking a more active,
outcome-based approach to enforcement. 287 To enable regulators to
conduct comprehensive network adequacy reviews, regulations should
require more accurate provider directories and increased provider
participation in the process of updating directories. 288
a. Take a More Active, Outcome-Based Approach to

282. See, e.g., GOODELL, supra note 13, at 5 (“The study’s authors speculate that low reimbursement
(especially for psychotherapy services relative to medication management) . . . may [in part] explain why
many psychiatrists do not accept insurance.”).
283. See id.
284. See generally Stacy Weiner, Addressing the Escalating Psychiatrist Shortage, ASS’N OF AM. MED.
COLLS. (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/addressing-escalating-psychiatrist-shortage
[https://perma.cc/49VZ-RVWF] (describing how the high demand for psychiatric services outpaces the
growth of the profession).
285. LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 17 (“[M]ost states do not engage in rigorous, ongoing
monitoring or take meaningful enforcement actions.”).
286. See id.
287. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
288. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
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Enforcement
Ultimately, network adequacy regulations aspire to achieve access
to care.289 Rather than trying to concoct the perfect regulatory formula
at the outset, which will inevitably vary from state to state, regulators
should first focus on realizing the full potential of their existing
network adequacy regulations by enforcing them properly and
adjusting as necessary.290 If regulators do not enforce the regulations
they promulgate, piling on more will have little effect.
A system that emphasizes patient outcomes—as opposed to rigidly
and automatically penalizing insurers for violations of quantitative
requirements—best equips regulators to pursue network adequacy in a
way that achieves the desired results while minimizing the burden on
insurers.291 Generally, insurers and regulators broadly agree that an
effective enforcement scheme requires some degree of flexibility.292
An outcome-based approach asks the ultimate question: Can patients
get the timely care they need? Of the quantitative metrics, wait times
best answer this question because they illuminate “actual ability to
receive timely care.”293 Conversely, geographic standards or provider
ratios simply shed light on the number and distribution of providers. 294
Accordingly, regulators should conduct wait-time audits by requiring
insurers to report wait times for in-network behavioral health care
289. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 14 (“Even with quantitative standards in place, the ultimate
question is whether available network resources are adequate for a patient’s particular needs.”).
290. See WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 277, at 5 (“In 2014, the consumer representatives to the NAIC
commissioned a survey of state departments of insurance (DOIs); [thirty-eight] states responded to the
survey. The results showed that . . . state DOIs rarely took enforcement actions for violations of network
adequacy requirements.”).
291. See HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 22 (“[L]ooser regulatory reigns on network composition
would give health plans more flexibility to adapt to market conditions and to adopt promising innovations
in care delivery.”).
292. WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 277, at 6–7 (“Although quantitative criteria can help regulators
evaluate provider networks more efficiently and establish clear standards to review for compliance,
stakeholders agreed that regulators need some flexibility in applying those standards to specific situations,
such as areas with significant provider workforce shortages or topographic/geographic barriers. A
bright-line standard cannot resolve every case.”).
293. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 23 (“If quantitative standards are adopted, consideration
should be given to maximum wait times (rather than simply number and distribution of providers). Wait
times can be useful to monitor actual ability to receive timely care, and to help resolve individual
disputes.”).
294. See id.
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services.295 Regulators should also investigate wait times
independently through “secret shopper” surveys.296
In states that employ appointment wait-time requirements, insurers
should pay fines when they cannot affirmatively demonstrate that,
despite best efforts, market conditions prevent their compliance. 297 In
states that do not use wait-time requirements, panels of independent
behavioral health experts should evaluate the results of wait-time
audits to determine whether plans have the capacity to meet their
enrollees’ needs in a reasonable time. 298 Moreover, independent
medical experts (who already conduct external reviews of “medical
necessity” determinations on a case-by-case basis) should evaluate
individual appeals for denials of out-of-network behavioral health care
claims.299 When these independent experts determine that patients had
no choice but to go out of network—regardless if they did so
knowingly—regulations should prohibit insurers from holding patients
financially liable.300 To appease insurers, however, external review
processes should require patients to seek prior authorization whenever
their condition allows.301 Due to the burden that appeals place on
providers and patients, state regulators should not use them as the
primary means of monitoring compliance.302
295. Id. at 20 (“[H]ealth plans could either be encouraged, or required, to report typical or average wait
times[,] . . . giving consumers information to evaluate when they shop for insurance.”).
296. Id.; LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 11.
297. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 23 (“[Quantitative] metrics should be subject to exceptions
for innovations in care delivery (telemedicine, centers of excellence), or when market conditions do not
reasonably allow full compliance, despite best efforts.”).
298. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 156.230(a)(2) (2016) (requiring, similarly to the qualitative standards used
by many states, that ACA Marketplace plans “assure that all [mental health and substance abuse] services
will be accessible without unreasonable delay”).
299. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 23 (“The existing external review process by independent
medical experts that is used to resolve ‘medical necessity’ dispute[s] can also be used to determine when
patients should be allowed to go out of network to meet their medical needs.”).
300. Id. (“Patients should be held financially harmless when a reviewer determines there are grounds
to receive care out of network.”).
301. Id. (“To allow health plans to arrange for needed services at reasonable costs, patients should be
required to pursue external review in a timely manner, prior to treatment if feasible.”).
302. VOLK ET AL., supra note 142, at 13 (“While [behavioral health] provider[s] . . . are able to get
[denials of coverage] overturned through the appeals process, repeatedly having to deal with [denials of
coverage] creates undue burden on providers and patients.”); LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 12
(“Although regulators often monitor network adequacy through consumer complaints, this enforcement
tool places an undue burden on consumers to monitor compliance and likely reflects an
under-representation of compliance issues.”).
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Once regulators step up enforcement measures, they can make more
informed determinations about the need to alter existing regulatory
frameworks in their states. 303 For example, large rural states may still
find geographic standards necessary even with controlled wait
times.304 In the direst cases of provider shortages, states should
consider passing narrow AWP laws that apply only to behavioral
health specialists. 305
b. Strengthen Provider Directory Accuracy Standards
To buttress network adequacy enforcement efforts and improve
behavioral health patients’ ability to reliably locate in-network care,
federal regulations should require state to adopt their own reasonable
standards for behavioral health directories. 306 As of June 2020, fewer
than half of states had their own standards for directory accuracy. 307
Federal regulations should also require states to conduct periodic
audits of their provider directories and report the results to federal
regulators to keep tabs on the efficacy of network adequacy
requirements.308
Further, state regulations should also require providers to either
proactively alert insurers when their information changes or respond
to insurers’ requests to validate or update information within a certain

303. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 110, at 17 (“[M]ost states do not engage in rigorous, ongoing
monitoring or take meaningful enforcement actions.”); see also JACOBI & RAGONE, supra note 47, at 23
(“In general, carriers, providers, regulators, and advocates crave more guidance regarding analyzing and
evaluating NQTLs, like reimbursement rates and criteria used in selecting providers for networks.”).
304. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 58, at 10 (“Quantitative standards need to reflect widely different
demographic and geographic realities. In sparse, frontier areas, there are far fewer providers to go
around . . . .”).
305. Market conditions—namely drastic shortfalls in patient choice (the problem area most frequently
cited by AWP laws proponents) and low reimbursement for behavioral health care services (negating the
bargaining-power arguments cited by AWP opponents)—justify limited enactment of these laws in states
where insurers struggle to provide robust networks due to provider shortages. See supra Part II.A.3.
306. Directory accuracy standards typically entail requiring insurers to update their provider directories
at regular intervals to ensure that consumers have the most up-to-date information about which providers
they can see without incurring out-of-network expenses. See supra Part II.A.5.
307. Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 981 (“Approximately twenty states have requirements directly
related to directory accuracy for private plans . . . .”).
308. Id. at 982 (“States should also consider employing additional monitoring tools, such as patient
surveys, audits, and comparisons to external data sources.”).
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period of time.309 The insurance industry spends enormous sums trying
to track down provider information, and although insurers should bear
the ultimate burden of ensuring the accuracy of their directories, health
care providers are better positioned to facilitate the process; insurers’
obligation of tracking down every provider in an insurance network
presents a much greater challenge than a single provider’s task of
reporting its own information. 310
Reports suggest that some providers are not aware of the importance
of updating their information, and because regulations often do not
require providers to update their information regularly, insurers’
requests for updates or verification may fall toward the bottom of
providers’ list of priorities.311 Thus, requiring providers’ compliance
with insurer requests will both raise awareness and make directory
accuracy a priority for providers. 312 Likewise, regulators must begin to
prioritize directory accuracy themselves because of its importance for
network adequacy enforcement. 313 To affect sustainable change,
however, incentives for behavioral health care providers to join
insurance networks must supplement strengthened regulatory
structures.314

309. See AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, PROVIDER DIRECTORY INITIATIVE KEY FINDINGS 6 (2017),
https://www.ahip.org/resources/provider-directory-initiative-key-findings
[https://perma.cc/F4VADCSB] (describing providers’ general lack of engagement with the processes ensuring directory accuracy
and their tendency not to prioritize submitting responses to insurance companies’ requests to validate or
update their information).
310. Morse, supra note 195 (“An estimated $2.1 billion is spent annually across the healthcare system
chasing and maintaining provider data.”); see also Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 981 (“[L]ack of
provider engagement . . . [has] been noted as [a] possible cause[] of directory inaccuracies.”).
311. AM.’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, supra note 309, at 6 (“While providers indicated that they were
familiar with provider directories and were aware that directories are used to help consumers find
clinicians who are in-network, . . . they . . . [e]xpressed a general lack of awareness regarding the need to
proactively alert plans of changes to their information [and] [d]id not understand the purpose of, or need
for, responding to plan requests to validate or update their information[.]”). Also, providers “[f]elt
overwhelmed with responsibility and therefore prioritized activities that were required of them by
regulation or to secure payment for the provider.” Id.
312. See id.
313. See Busch & Kyanko, supra note 64, at 981.
314. See supra Part III.B.
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B. Incentivize Psychiatrists to Accept Insurance
To expand access to mental health care, state and federal legislators
should adopt a two-step, increasingly generous, tax incentive structure.
The first step should directly incentivize psychiatrists to accept private
insurance. Psychiatrists will decline insurance for as long as it remains
profitable to do so.315 Further, psychiatrists who accept insurance are
more likely to form group practices and hire ancillary staff to handle
administrative work and insurance billing, which creates jobs and
increases psychiatrists’ face time with patients.316
Second, governments should provide more generous tax incentives
for psychiatrists to accept Medicaid. Individuals with SMI present as
both the group most in need of psychiatric services and the group least
able to pay for them. 317 Data reveals “significantly lower Medicaid
acceptance rates among psychiatrists than physicians in other medical
specialties.”318 Nonetheless, in 2014, Medicaid funds accounted for
one quarter of the total spending on mental health services and 21% of
total spending on substance use disorder services. 319 The following
year, an estimated 2.5 million Medicaid recipients still reported an
unmet need for mental health treatment. 320 These figures highlight the
importance of Medicaid acceptance in the effort to expand access to
mental health care.321 Tax incentives can only go so far, however,

315. See Pear, supra note 157.
316. See Bishop et al., supra note 164, at 180 (“Solo practices often can function with much less
infrastructure than larger single-specialty or multispecialty group practices. As a result, they may have
little incentive to hire staff to interact with insurance companies.”); see also Kane, supra note 165
(detailing the large number of hours psychiatrists spend on administrative tasks).
317. See Levinson et al., supra note 160, at 114 (“[P]revious research has shown that earnings and
long-term work incapacity are both much more strongly related to serious mental illness than to less
serious forms of mental illness.”).
318. HONBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
319. JULIA ZUR, MARYBETH MUSUMECI & RACHEL GARFIELD, KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID’S
ROLE IN FINANCING BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS 7–8 (2017),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Medicaids-Role-in-Financing-Behavioral-Health-Services-forLow-Income-Individuals [https://perma.cc/H93G-4QUY].
320. Id. at 6.
321. See id.
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without a simultaneous increase in the supply of providers to bridge
the gap.322
C. Bridge the Gap Between Behavioral Health Care Providers and
Patients
Governments should take three steps to reduce the supply-demand
gap for behavioral health care providers. First, governments must
bolster workforce recruitment in the field. To that end, the federal
government should reallocate funding for student loan assistance, and
state governments should expand scopes of practice. 323 Second,
educators should establish experiential programs designed to pique
interest in behavioral health careers early in education. 324 Third,
governments should cultivate telehealth and integrated care models. 325
1. Bolster Workforce Recruitment in Behavioral Health Care
Alleviating the cost of entering psychiatry remains a key method of
bridging the supply-demand gap for behavioral services. 326 PSLF
322. See id. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH WORKFORCE ANALYSIS, NATIONAL PROJECTIONS
SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR SELECTED BEHAVIORAL HEALTH PRACTITIONERS: 2013–2025 (2016),
https://bhw.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/bhw/health-workforce-analysis/research/projections/behavioralhealth2013-2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J7Y-26PH] (projecting growing workforce shortages for
behavioral health care providers).
323. See generally Billy Long, The Importance of the National Health Service Corps, SPRINGFIELD
NEWS-LEADER
(Oct.
17,
2017,
5:10
PM),
https://www.newsleader.com/story/opinion/2017/10/17/importance-national-health-service-corps/772355001/
[https://perma.cc/TR2T-C6TA] (describing the benefits and importance of the scholarships and loan
repayment programs (LRPs) to medical students and rural communities).
324. See infra Part III.C.2.
325. See, e.g., Shantanu Agrawal & Tejal Gandhi, Telehealth Should Be Expanded—If It Can Address
Today’s
Health
Care
Challenges,
HEALTH
AFFS.
BLOG
(Sept.
23,
2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20200916.264569/full/
[https://perma.cc/64ZB4S6K] (“Telehealth offers strong advantages and benefits for some patients. It markedly increases the
convenience and availability of clinical services without long delays or waiting room time.”).
326. See Budd, supra note 212. On average, public medical school costs students $250,222, and private
medical schools cost $330,180. Id. The average medical student borrows between $183,000 and $200,000
to cover these high costs. Compare Samer Cabbabe, Would You Encourage Your Child to Follow in Your
Footsteps and Become a Physician?, 114 MO. MED., Jan./Feb. 2017, at 4, 4 (“The average medical student
graduates with $183,000 in debt . . . .”), with Budd, supra note 212 (indicating the median medical school
debt was $200,000 in 2019). Because psychiatrists are medical doctors, their degrees fall in this price
range. Cost vs Reward of a Psychiatry Education, DOCTORLY.ORG, https://doctorly.org/cost-vs-rewardof-a-psychiatry-degree/ [https://perma.cc/N2MM-R5AW].
OF
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provides one route to financial assistance that can help people become
doctors, and society should not aim to dissuade them.327 Some of the
funds currently allotted to PSLF, however, may achieve similar ends
elsewhere while also doing more to reduce disparities for behavioral
health.328
Imposing modest limits on forgiveness for lower-demand medical
specialists’ school loans under PSLF would allow a reallocation of
those funds to NHSC programs, which specifically target behavioral
health.329 Exemptions or higher caps for other in-demand groups such
as primary care physicians—projected to become the primary
recipients of PSLF—would help abate concerns about the collateral
damage of these limits. 330 Because other groups with relatively less
severe shortage projections increasingly plan to apply for PSLF, even
modest, narrow caps could produce substantial yields.331 These limits
would complement recent increases in federal expenditures for
behavioral health training.332
Moreover, the design of NHSC programs themselves should be
altered to provide a more generous benefit for behavioral health
specialists. Currently, NHSC appears to reimburse loans at blanket
rates across all disciplines.333 Though it offers different types of LRPs,
327. Lockert, supra note 217 (“[A]s a healthcare professional, you may be in six-figure debt. [If] this
is your situation, weigh the pros and cons of NHSC versus [PSLF].”).
328. Friedman et al., supra note 218, at 1240 (“If implemented, the funds liberated by [a PSLF] cap
could be used to fund loan forgiveness programs that incentivize graduates to pursue specialties that
society needs or encourage practice within health professional shortage areas.”).
329. Id.
330. Id. (“PSLF could become the greatest source of loan forgiveness funds for those pursuing primary
care. . . . If enacted, the proposed cap on individual forgiveness under PSLF may impact many new
doctors and potentially limit loan forgiveness support for physicians where it is most needed.”).
331. Id. (“[A] high percentage of forgiveness for physicians will also be directed toward medical
specialists and surgeons.”); Press Release, Stuart Heiser, Senior Media Rels. Specialist of Ass’n of Am.
Med. Colls., New Findings Confirm Predictions on Physician Shortage (Apr. 23, 2019) [hereinafter Press
Release, Stuart Heiser], https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/press-releases/new-findings-confirmpredictions-physician-shortage [https://perma.cc/XBQ9-CG7J] (suggesting that, by 2032, medical
workforce shortfalls will range from 21,100 to 55,200 for primary care physicians, 1,900 to 12,100 for
medical specialists, and 14,300 to 23,400 for surgical specialists).
332. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 228; HHS Awards $319 Million to Support Health
Workforce Providers Caring for the Underserved, supra note 228.
333. See National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment Program, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
NAT’L HEALTH SERV. CORPS, https://nhsc.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/NHSC/loan-repayment/nhsc-lrpfact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/29MR-KZPX] (indicating uniform loan repayment rates for the applicable
disciplines).
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which repay up to different amounts, NHSC could encourage more
aspiring health care professionals to specialize in behavioral health by
providing more generous terms for the discipline specifically. 334 The
disproportionate supply-demand gap in behavioral health care would
justify NHSC in carving out this exception. 335 To ensure that other
high-demand, NHSC-eligible disciplines do not bear the brunt of more
generous behavioral health repayments, funding for the repayments
should come from the new limits on PSLF medical loan forgiveness.
Further, because the HRSA designates so much of the land area in
the United States as an HPSA for mental health, mental health care
providers can choose from a wider array of practice locations while
still maintaining eligibility for NHSC programs. 336 Recruitment should
emphasize this aspect as a selling point for would-be medical students
who might not otherwise consider a career in psychiatry or apply to
NHSC programs because they lack a desire or ability to relocate to a
rural area.337 NHSC’s selection processes, however, temper the allure
of the eligible locations’ diversity because NHSC understandably
prioritizes areas and populations with the most need. 338
334. Which One Is Right for You?, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., NAT’L HEALTH SERV. CORPS,
https://nhsc.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/nhsc/loan-repayment/loan-repayment-comparison.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6RB7-4KQ9] (indicating payments up to $50,000 for two years of service in NHSC’s
LRP for dentists, payments up to $75,000 for three years of service in NHSC’s SUD Workforce LRP, and
payments up to $100,000 for three years of service in NHSC’s Rural Community LRP).
335. Compare Mental Health Professional Shortage Areas Table, supra note 64 (cataloging the number
of Americans that live in a HPSA for mental health, which equaled 129,640,558 as of September 30,
2021), with Primary Care Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs), KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/primary-care-health-professional-shortage-areas-hpsas/
[https://perma.cc/4DEC-FLHL] (Sept. 30, 2021) (listing the number of Americans living in a primary care
HPSA, which equaled 83,711,000 as of September 30, 2021), and Dental Care Health Professional
Shortage Areas (HPSAs), KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/dental-carehealth-professional-shortage-areas-hpsas/ [https://perma.cc/G3LU-UCTR] (Sept. 30, 2021) (listing the
number of Americans living in a dental care HPSA, which equaled 61,899,714 as of September 30,
2021—fewer than half the people living in mental health HPSAs).
336. See Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) — Mental Health, supra note 230 (depicting
widespread HPSAs for mental health).
337. See Health Professional Shortage Areas, 2017 Postcard, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/health-professional-shortage-areas-2017postcard.aspx [https://perma.cc/HJ6F-MBYP] (“[Fifty-nine] percent of all primary care HPSAs are
located in rural areas.”).
338. HRSAtube, supra note 225, at 00:34–00:57 (“If an applicant meets all the necessary program
criteria and has eligible educational loans, they are ranked based on the site’s [HPSA] score. . . . The
higher the HPSA score, the higher the need.”); see also National Health Service Corps Loan Repayment
Program, supra note 333 (indicating higher repayment rates for higher HPSA scores).
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In addition to using federal dollars to make school more affordable
for psychiatrists, state governments should expand behavioral health
scopes of practice (SOPs). SOPs “define which services a state or
territory allows a licensed or certified professional to perform.”339
Areas for reasonable expansion exist with many SOPs.340 For example,
SOPs only authorize telehealth services by psychiatrists in thirty-one
states, psychologists in twenty-one states, social workers in
twenty-one states, and fewer for all other behavioral health
professionals.341 More states should expand authorization of telehealth
services to more behavioral health disciplines, particularly considering
the expansion of telehealth services during the COVID-19
pandemic.342 Further, twenty-two states require an associate’s degree
or higher to become credentialed as an addiction counselor. 343
Relaxing educational and credentialing requirements wherever
feasible would reduce barriers to a field desperately in need of more
workers and allow cheaper and easier career alternatives to expand
services in rural areas and beyond. 344 At the same time, however, states
should take care to promote behavioral health education programs. 345

339. CORY PAGE, ANGELA J. BECK, JESSICA BUCHE, PHILLIP M. SINGER, CHRISTIAN VAZQUEZ &
BRIAN PERRON, UNIV. OF MICH. BEHAV. HEALTH WORKFORCE RSCH. CTR., NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
SCOPES OF PRACTICE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH WORKFORCE 1 (2017),
https://behavioralhealthworkforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/FA3_SOP_Full-Report_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MB4-G5HK].
340. See id. at 9.
341. Id.
342. Lisa M. Koonin, Brooke Hoots, Clarisse A. Tsang, Zanie Leroy, Kevin Farris, Brandon Jolly, Peter
Antall & Bridget McCabe et al., Trends in the Use of Telehealth During the Emergence of the COVID-19
Pandemic—United States, January–March 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1595, 1595
(2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6943a3-H.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PQMXBQ6] (“During the first quarter of 2020, the number of telehealth visits increased by 50%, compared
with the same period in 2019, with a 154% increase in visits noted in surveillance week 13 in 2020,
compared with the same period in 2019. During January–March 2020, most encounters were from patients
seeking care for conditions other than COVID-19.”).
343. Practitioner: Behavioral Health Providers, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SCOPE OF
PRAC.
POL’Y,
http://scopeofpracticepolicy.org/practitioners/behavioral-health-providers/
[https://perma.cc/NG7Z-HQ9M].
344. Occupational Outlook Handbook: Substance Abuse, Behavioral Disorder, and Mental Health
Counselors, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ooh/community-and-socialservice/substance-abuse-behavioral-disorder-and-mental-health-counselors.htm#tab-1
[https://perma.cc/XP22-RUKJ] (Dec. 13, 2021) (showing a 25% job growth rate, which is “much faster
than average,” for addiction, behavioral disorder, and mental health counselors between 2019 and 2029).
345. See infra Part III.B.2.
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2. Foster Interest in Behavioral Health Care Early in Education
In addition to strengthening programs that make medical school
more affordable and expanding SOPs, governments should fund
programs aimed at fostering early interest in science and medical
careers. To date, many similar programs have yielded mixed results.346
Some studies, however, indicate that exposure to a field or an inspiring
mentor can lead to a “defining moment” that inspires a young student’s
career decisions.347 Researchers specifically suggest that psychiatry
could benefit from increased early exposure. 348
To be sure, recruitment to the field of health care generally faces an
uphill battle.349 Physicians constitute one of the unhappiest of
professions: doctors commit suicide at higher rates than any other
occupation, and in a survey of five thousand physicians, “nine out of
ten . . . indicated an unwillingness to recommend health care as a
profession.”350 The negative emotional impacts of the profession may
be compounded by “compassion fatigue,” which can plague
psychiatrists and other health care professionals alike.351
346. Lynne Holden, Bernice Rumala, Patricia Carson & Elliot Siegel, Promoting Careers in Health
Care for Urban Youth: What Students, Parents and Educators Can Teach Us, 34 INFO. SERVS. & USE
355, 364 (2014); see also, e.g., Ryan Callihan, Grant Aims to Foster Science, Medical Careers,
HERALD-TRIB., https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20170628/grant-aims-to-foster-science-medicalcareers [https://perma.cc/4P6Q-KF4J] (June 28, 2017, 5:56 PM) (“[Science Students Together Reaching
Instructional Diversity (SSTRIDE)] aims to encourage students to pursue a career in STEM and ‘a
possible future in health care.’ . . . More than half of the students who have gone through the SSTRIDE
program have chosen majors in math, science[,] or health upon entering college.”).
347. Holden et al., supra note 346, at 359.
348. Paul J. Lambe, Thomas C. E. Gale, Tristan Price & Martin J. Roberts, Sociodemographic and
Educational Characteristics of Doctors Applying for Psychiatry Training in the UK: Secondary Analysis
of Data from the UK Medical Education Database Project, 43 BJPSYCH BULL. 264, 268 (2019)
(“Perhaps . . . increased early exposure to teaching and practical experience of psychiatry for students and
postgraduates may ameliorate the UK recruitment crisis.”).
349. See Press Release, Stuart Heiser, supra note 331, at 4 (describing the dire physician shortages
projected by 2032). See generally Cabbabe, supra note 326 (describing the drawbacks of the medical
industry and the rampant unhappiness among physicians).
350. Cabbabe, supra note 326, at 4 (“Doctors have the highest rate of suicide of any profession. Every
year, between 300 and 400 physicians take their own lives, approximately one per day.”).
351. Joseph A. Boscarino, Richard E. Adams & Charles R. Figley, Secondary Trauma Issues for
Psychiatrists, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/secondarytrauma-issues-psychiatrists [https://perma.cc/HXA9-RXTD] (“Compassion fatigue has been clinically
defined as the formal caregiver’s reduced capacity or interest in being empathic or ‘bearing the suffering
of clients’ and is the behavioral and emotional state that results from knowing about a traumatizing event

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss3/13

60

Williams: 404 Provider Not Found

2022]

404 PROVIDER NOT FOUND

1049

The field of medicine, however, has its draws: high demand and
projected workforce shortages translate to high salaries and promising
job outlooks, which comprise perhaps the most salient lodestones. 352
These characteristics apply equally to psychiatry. 353 Further,
psychiatry offers unique benefits that may attract some medical
students: psychiatrists may enjoy a better work-life balance compared
with other medical disciplines, and its family-friendliness has been
seen as a selling point in recruiting medical students to the field. 354
Recruitment should highlight these aspects. And although
psychiatrists’ self-employment trends contribute to the inadequacy of
insurance networks, the opportunity to be self-employed may attract
some medical students. 355
In addition to promoting psychiatry, pipeline programs should not
neglect to promote less expensive career alternatives that still play an
important role in bridging the supply-demand gap in behavioral health
care.356 These educational programs would complement SOP
expansions.357 To become a social worker, for example, most states
minimally require a bachelor’s degree in social work (BSW), as
experienced by another person.”). “[I]t appears that providing psychotherapy to traumatized patients puts
therapists at risk for mental health problems.” Id. “Secondary traumatization also affects other health care
professionals . . . .” Id.
352. See Cost vs Reward of a Psychiatry Education, supra note 326; see also Physician Starting
Salaries by Specialty: 2019 vs. 2018, supra note 222 (showing six-figure starting salaries for all types of
physicians, and even for physician assistants and CRNAs).
353. See Psychiatrist Overview: What Is a Psychiatrist?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
https://money.usnews.com/careers/best-jobs/psychiatrist [https://perma.cc/M9RE-RJKV] (noting that the
Bureau of Labor Statistics projects 15.8% employment growth for psychiatrists from 2018 to 2028); see
also News Release, U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stats., Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2018:
29-1066
Psychiatrists,
at
tbl.1
(Mar.
29,
2019),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ocwage_03292019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W972-2JN6]
(listing the 2018 mean annual wage for psychiatrists as $220,380).
354. Lambe et al., supra note 348, at 268, 269.
355. Cost vs Reward of a Psychiatry Education, supra note 326 (“The flexibility and autonomy that a
self-employed psychiatrist enjoys is one of the most attractive rewards of starting a private
practice. . . . Psychiatric entrepreneurs can also set their own schedules, and choose to combine private
practice work with hours at a hospital or a local facility, if they wish.”).
356. Compare Budd, supra note 212 (“The average four-year cost [of medical school] for public school
students is $250,222. For private school students, the cost is $330,180.”), with Social Work Degrees: What
You’ll Study, ALL PSYCH. SCHS., https://www.allpsychologyschools.com/social-work/degrees/
[https://perma.cc/39WH-SB4H] (“[T]he average annual cost[] [to obtain a bachelor’s degree in social
work (BSW) from] a four-year, public institution runs around $9,970 per year for in-state tuition.”).
357. See supra Part III.B.1.
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compared with the approximately twelve years of school necessary to
become a psychiatrist.358 To practice in a clinical setting, students need
only a Master of Social Work (MSW) degree, which is priced modestly
compared to the cost of medical school. 359 The lower relative costs of
these degrees may drive the higher rate of job growth for substance
abuse, behavioral disorder, and mental disorder counselors, which
outpaces even the explosive growth of the field of psychiatry. 360
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, early exposure to the scale
and prevalence of behavioral health problems in the United States will
do more to diminish the stigma that surrounds them.361 Research has
shown that people with a better understanding of mental health reject
stigmatic views more frequently. 362 Thus, by focusing on bolstering
mental health education and awareness from an early age, the effects
of harmful societal views about mental health conditions may be
diminished.363
3. Remove Barriers to Behavioral Telehealth and Continue

358. How
to
Become
a
Social
Worker,
LEARN
HOW
TO
BECOME,
https://www.learnhowtobecome.org/social-worker/ [https://perma.cc/DA8R-ZE2B] (“To meet social
worker education requirements, prospective social workers must hold a bachelor’s degree. Students
interested in clinical roles must hold a [Master’s of Social Work (MSW)] degree to apply for a clinical
social work license.”); Cost vs Reward of a Psychiatry Education, supra note 326 (“In the end, it takes at
least 12 years of school for an individual to become a psychiatrist, which qualifies a graduate to gain
licensure in order to work in the U.S. and become certified from the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology (ABPN), if desired.”).
359. How to Become a Social Worker, supra note 358. Compare Social Work Degrees: What You’ll
Study, supra note 356 (“Master’s degree program tuition at in-state public institutions costs an average of
$8,670 per year . . . .”), with Budd, supra note 212 (describing the high cost of medical school).
360. Compare Occupational Outlook Handbook: Substance Abuse, Behavioral Disorder, and Mental
Disorder Counselors, supra note 344 (listing job growth from 2019 to 2029 as “much faster than average”
at 25%), with Psychiatrist Overview: What Is a Psychiatrist?, supra note 353 (noting that the Bureau of
Labor Statistics projects 15.8% employment growth for psychiatrists from 2018 to 2028).
361. See Corrigan & Watson, supra note 22, at 17 (noting the impact of educational programs on mental
illness and specifically noting the programs’ effectiveness with college undergraduates and adolescents).
362. Id. (“Research . . . has suggested that persons who evince a better understanding of mental illness
are less likely to endorse stigma and discrimination. Hence, the strategic provision of information about
mental illness seems to lessen negative stereotypes.” (citations omitted)).
363. Id. (“Several studies have shown that participation in education programs on mental illness led to
improved attitudes about persons with these problems. Education programs are effective for a wide variety
of participants, including college undergraduates, graduate students, adolescents, community residents,
and persons with mental illness.” (citations omitted)).
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Integrated Care Models
To maximize the potential of telehealth services in bridging
provider-patient gaps, governments must address internet
infrastructure and disparities in telehealth parity laws. First, public
policy should aim to foster competition among internet service
providers (ISPs) and expand the breadth and quality of services
available to both urban and rural residents alike. 364 Although some
blame a relative lack of competition among ISPs on excessive
governmental restrictions, others suggest that targeted regulations may
actually increase competition. 365 For example, one method for
encouraging competition is through “local loop unbundling,” which
involves requiring ISPs to lease parts of their infrastructure to
competitors, allowing more companies to enter the market. 366 In rural
areas, granting temporary exemptions from these types of regulations
might give ISPs additional incentive to expand their infrastructure
there.
But private rural citizens cannot afford to rely entirely on market
forces, so bringing broadband internet to rural areas would require
direct federal investment.367 Since 2018, the Federal Communication
364. Jeff Dunn, America Has an Internet Problem — but a Radical Change Could Solve It, BUS.
INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2017, 10:09 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/internet-isps-competition-netneutrality-ajit-pai-fcc-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/3JSH-PM86] (“[Removing barriers to entry into the
market for would-be internet service providers (ISPs)] could result in a floodgate of competition,
potentially bringing far more choice between price and speed in all parts of the country.”); see also Lift
Every Voice: The Biden Plan for Black America, JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/blackamerica/
[https://perma.cc/R9KT-7AF5] (“[Joe Biden] will encourage competition among [ISPs], to increase
speeds and decrease prices in urban, suburban, and rural areas.”).
365. Ryan Radia, Competitive Enter. Inst., Improving America’s Broadband Through Competition, Not
Regulation,
in
ONPOINT
1
(2017),
https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Ryan_Radia__Improving_America_s_Broadband_through_Competition.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HUG-N9EH] (“A
laundry list of acts and omissions by government officials at the federal, state, and local levels have
discouraged companies from entering the broadband market. If lawmakers embraced a less restrictive,
more open approach to private-sector deployment of wireline and wireless broadband infrastructure, many
Americans might enjoy a more compelling array of choices among [ISPs].”); Dunn, supra note 364(“[A]
process known as ‘local loop unbundling[]’ . . . involves regulating ISPs to lease or open up the ‘last mile’
of their infrastructure to other ISPs, [which would] then sell internet service plans over the wires that are
already in place. The immense barriers to entry for any would-be ISP would disappear.”).
366. Dunn, supra note 364.
367. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., A CASE FOR RURAL BROADBAND: INSIGHTS ON RURAL BROADBAND
INFRASTRUCTURE AND NEXT GENERATION PRECISION AGRICULTURE TECHNOLOGIES 6 (2019) (“A recent
Deloitte Consulting analysis estimates the United States requires between $130 and $150 billion over the
next five to seven years, to adequately support rural coverage and 5G wireless densification.”).
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Commission’s (FCC) Connect America Fund has conducted reverse
auctions, which encourage ISPs to bid on the amount of subsidies they
would need to bring internet services to a particular area.368 The FCC
should continue these auctions. Although this method of allocating
subsidies can effectively grant an ISP a short-term monopoly in a
certain area, the exclusivity preserves ISPs’ incentives to invest.369
Once the infrastructure exists, regulators could phase in practices like
local loop bundling to foster competition in rural areas.370
Although the needed federal investment appears substantial, the
funds supply an essential piece of the puzzle for the one in five
Americans that live in a rural area, many of whom may otherwise be
left behind.371 As dependence on the internet in modern life increases,
so does recognition of the internet’s capabilities in the delivery of
behavioral health care services. 372 Beyond behavioral health care,
governments should emphasize the financial benefits to ISPs and other
368. Wallsten, supra note 247 (“Reverse auctions are likely to yield the best outcomes. In this case, the
government would define the network services it believes everyone should have—hopefully based on a
careful analysis of both supply and demand information—and geographic areas it wants covered, and ask
companies to bid for how much money they would need in subsidies in order to build out in those areas.”);
Rural
Broadband
Auctions,
FED.
COMMC’NS
COMM’N,
https://www.fcc.gov/auctions/ruralbroadbandauctions [https://perma.cc/2GWV-PK7K] (Apr. 13, 2021)
(“In 2018, the [FCC] conducted the first of these [reverse] auctions.”).
369. See Wallsten, supra note 247 (describing the auction process by which ISPs compete with one
another for subsidies in a particular area).
370. Dunn, supra note 364 (describing how local loop bundling can foster competition).
371. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 209; see DAN LITTMAN,
CRAIG WIGGINTON, PHIL WILSON, BRETT HAAN & JACK FRITZ, DELOITTE, COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE
UPGRADE:
THE
NEED
FOR
DEEP
FIBER
4
(2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-mediatelecommunications/us-tmt-5GReady-the-need-for-deep-fiber-pov.pdf [https://perma.cc/25AS-BBR7]
(“A Deloitte Consulting LLP analysis estimates that the United States requires between $130 and $150
billion over the next 5–7 years to adequately support broadband competition, rural coverage and wireless
densification.”); see also Lift Every Voice: The Biden Plan for Black America, supra note 366 (proposing
a $20 billion investment in rural broadband infrastructure and to “triple funding to expand broadband
access in rural areas . . . .”).
372. Joseph Firth, John Torous, Brendon Stubbs, Josh A. Firth, Genevieve Z. Steiner, Lee Smith, Mario
Alvarez-Jimenez & John Gleeson et al., The “Online Brain”: How the Internet May be Changing Our
Cognition, 18 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 119, 119 (2019) (“The [i]nternet is the most widespread and rapidly
adopted technology in the history of humanity. In only decades, [i]nternet use has completely re-invented
the ways in which we search for information, consume media and entertainment, and manage our social
networks and relationships.”); see SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note
209, at 6 (“Until recently, billing for telebehavioral health services was limited. However, this is changing
as insurance carriers recognize that telehealth is able to provide evidence-based care in a cost-effective
way.”).
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industries to facilitate a more rapid expansion of rural internet
infrastructure.373
Moreover, states must permanently strengthen telehealth parity
laws. Though only three of the forty-three states with telehealth
commercial payer statues fail to mandate coverage parity for in-person
and telehealth services, only fourteen states mandate “true ‘payment
parity.’”374 Low telehealth reimbursement, much like for behavioral
health care services generally, disincentivizes providers from entering
the telehealth market. 375 Due to the long-term cost-effectiveness of
telehealth, reimbursement parity benefits providers, payers, and
patients alike.376
Finally, health care providers should continue to employ integrated
care models wherever possible to manage milder mental health
conditions.377 Evidence firmly establishes that these models provide
effective treatment and long-term savings.378 By collaborating on care,
psychiatrists can improve health outcomes for both moderately and

373. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 367 (describing the numerous sectors of the
agricultural and tech industries that stand to benefit greatly from better access to internet technologies).
“Tech companies which stand to benefit from industry transformation continue to capitalize on [patterns
of digital transformation] by developing new technologies, which according to one recent study, may help
position themselves to capture a portion of an estimated $254 billion to $340 billion in global addressable
digital agriculture market.” Id. at 17.
374. LACKTMAN ET AL., supra note 255.
375. See id. at 7 (“Without payment parity, a health plan could unilaterally decide to pay network
providers for telehealth services at 50% of the reimbursement rate that health plan pays the provider for
an identical in-person service. This is not a theoretical risk, and actually occurred when New York
implemented its broad telehealth coverage law, which did not include any language regarding
payment/reimbursement rates.”).
376. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 209, at 6 (“[I]nsurance
carriers [increasingly] recognize that telehealth is able to provide evidence-based care in a cost-effective
way.”).
377. See UNÜTZER ET AL., supra note 234.
378. Wayne Katon, Jürgen Unützer, Kenneth Wells & Loretta Jones, Collaborative Depression Care:
History, Evolution, and Ways to Enhance Dissemination and Sustainability, 32 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY
456, 457–58 (2010) (“In some studies of more complex depressed patients, . . . there was evidence of a
high probability of savings in total medical costs associated with collaborative care.”); UNÜTZER ET AL.,
supra note 234, at 1 (“Implementation of evidence-based collaborative care in Medicaid . . . could
substantially improve medical and mental health outcomes and functioning, as well as reduce health care
costs.”); American Psychiatric Association, supra note 237, at 1:15–1:20 (“The Collaborative Care Model
has a rich body of scientific evidence supporting its efficacy.”).
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severely ill patients. 379 Where possible, governments should
encourage providers’ participation in these models. 380
CONCLUSION
The state of access to behavioral health care in the United States
leaves much to be desired. Despite broad state and federal mandates of
parity between behavioral care and other types of care, representation
of behavioral health care providers in insurance networks lags far
behind that of other types of providers. Regulations designed to cure
inadequate networks have fallen short of their goals in behavioral
health, largely due to a lack of adequate enforcement. Mounting
nationwide provider shortages, particularly in rural areas, complicate
efforts to expand access to behavioral health care services via
insurance coverage.381
Several reform strategies, however, can sharpen parity efforts and
mitigate the danger of worsening provider shortages. Targeted
expansions of loan repayment programs and scopes of practice can
advance recruitment to the behavioral health workforce, and integrated
care models can continue to promote its efficiency. The proliferation
of the internet can bring about a new age of behavioral telehealth,
which would bridge geographical divides. Educational programs can
inspire the next generation of behavioral health specialists. Stronger
requirements can improve the accuracy of provider directories and
network adequacy reviews. Existing network adequacy regulations can
realize their full potential through stronger, outcome-oriented
enforcement measures. And finally, quantitative reimbursement
standards and tax incentives can encourage behavioral health care
379. UNÜTZER ET AL., supra note 234, at 5 (“Studies have also tested collaborative care interventions
for different mental health conditions, including depression, anxiety disorders, and more serious
conditions such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Across this extensive literature, collaborative care
has consistently demonstrated higher effectiveness than usual care.” (citations omitted)).
380. See generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE COLLABORATIVE CARE MODEL FOR MENTAL
HEALTH:
RIGOROUS
RESEARCH
MEETS
REAL
WORLD
SUCCESS,
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Advocacy/Medicaid-Payment-CollaborativeCare-Model/CCM-for-MH-Rigorous-Research-Meets-Real-World-Success.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ8T353U] (describing the success of integrated behavioral health care programs across multiple states).
381. See generally CHIEDI, supra note 71.
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providers to participate in insurance networks, expanding access for
all, but especially for individuals who need it most. Together, these
changes can support the effort to prevent tragedies like the death of
Kristi Bennett.
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